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This edition of the Management Quarterly is a continua-
tion of a student project initiated in the Fourth Quarter of 
the 1968-1969 Academic Year. 
The articles which have been selected for inclusion in 
this edition of the M
0
anagement Quarterly have undergone a 
rigorous double-review process in order to qualify for selec-
tion for publication. First, candidate articles represent 
those student academic efforts which the various members of 
the faculty in the Operations Research and Administrative 
Sciences curricula consider as having exceptional merit in 
terms of well documented research, soundness of conclusions, 
and excellence of preparation. Second, submissions are 
screened by the editorial committee of the Management Quarter-
!l. in order to select for publication those articles which, 
in our opinion, represent the best works in terms of broad-
based appeal, readability, and informative value. 
The selections contained in this edition are diverse in 
their subject matter and represent the broad range of topics 
chosen as research projects by students in the Operations Re-
search and Administrative Sciences curricula. We, the editors, 
believe that the subjects discussed in the articles published 
herein are of value to the typical reader in that they pertain 
to the general knowledge and experience areas of the profes-
sional military officer and we hope that the range of topics 
will hold something of particular interest for each reader. 
We gratefully acknowledge the excellent literary efforts 
of the many students whose papers provided us with material 
from which selections for publication were made with true 
difficulty, and we also are deeply indebted to the members of 
the faculty without whose cooperation and interest this publi-
cation would not be possible. We believe that the Management 
Quarterly offers a unique medium through which well-deserved 
recognition can accrue to the authors of exceptionally well 
reported research projects and we invite students who feel 
that their recent academic efforts might be of interest to 
others to provide the editorial committee with a copy of the 
work involved. 
i 
The views expressed in the papers seiected for publica-
tion in this edition of the Mana9ement Quarterly are those 9f O 
the authors exclusively and in no way refl~ct the attitude or 
endorsement of the Defense Department, Navy Department, or 






.An Analysis Of Transfer 
In The Navy Stoclc 
Pricing 
fund 
By JU6.tln V. Mc.Ca.Jtthy 
In F.i.&c.ai. Yea/I. 1974, the Navy Ski.p.6 PaJrh Cantltol 
Cen:te1t, one 06 t:h.e thti.ee 1temai.ru.ng Navy Tnven:to1ty 
Con.t/Lol Po-i.n:u, wlt/:z. annual. 6alM o 6 ovelt 
$100,000,000, liteJtaUy wen:t 11b1tofz.e" wLtJu.n 6,i.ve 
mon:th.6 06 the .6.taA.t 06 the 6-i.&c.ai. yealt. Na.vy 
Stac.k Fund obligation a.uthowy ha.d been dlta.-i.ned 
f..l.LU:h no appa11.en:t 1teUe6 -in 6-lgh.t. Th-i..6 .6ame. 
.6UUJLtlon had oc.c.UNted -i.n vaAy-i.ng de.glte.M 601t 
the p1te.v-i.0U6 Je.velta.l ye.alt.6; howevelt, even t:hough 
aU Na.vy 1nve.n:to1ty Con.ttr.ol Po-in:u ha.d be.en a.6-
6ec..ted -i.n &ome. deg1tee., no a.c..t-i.on ~ taken ta 
c.M/t.ec..t the .6,i,tu.a;ti.on. Even at th-i..6 v.vi.,U,i,ng, 
ovelt 6,l6teen mon:th.6 6ollowlng ~ even:t, the 
Jame 6UUJLtlon .i.& Ufz.ely to 1tepe.at -iue.l6. 
Th-i..6 pa.pelt LIXl.ti 6ubml:tte.d to P1to6M601t Calt.6on 
Eoyang 601t Fundamerit:a.ll, 06 P1toje.c..t Mana.gemen:t 
IMN 3302). 
Introduction: 
Until recently, funding within the Navy Stock Fund has 
not presented a major problem. Since the reduction of fight-
ing in Vietnam, however, continued pressure has been placed 
on the Department of Defense to reduce spending in all areas. 
In many cases the resulting reductions have led to horizon-
tal cuts throughout the defense establishment. Such cuts 
have significantly reduced wasteful spending in many cases; 
however, they have also uncovered significant deficiencies in 
Navy cost control and accounting procedures. 
Ue.u:t.ena.n:t JU.6.tln V. Mc.Calr-thy, SC, U.S. Navy, 1tec.uve.d h-i..6 B.S. de.gJte.e. bt
Eng-i.ne.e.Jt-i.ng 61tom Oakland Un-i.ve!t6Uy -in 19 6 9. He i..6 p!tM e.n.tl!f a. c.aru:Udate. 
6a1t .the. M. S. deg1te.e. in S!f.6te.m6 Ac.qLLUiilion. Managemen:t at t:he. Naval Po.6t-
gfl.a.du.a,te. Sc.ho of.. 
1 
This analysis concentrates on the deficiencies inherent 
in Navy Stock Fund operations, more specifically, those o 
directly associated with transfer pricing in the Navy. Sine~ 
the existence of the Navy Stock Fund depends heavily on the 
sales dollars it generates, and these sales dollars are the 
driving force behind the situation described above, transfer 
prices are critical to the effective operation of the fund. 
If these prices are not effective in generating the sales 
which replenish the fund, sufficient funds will not be avail- 0 
able for continued operations. The result? The sales short-
fall which forced the Navy Ships Parts Control Center to stop 
all routine Navy Stock Fund operations is likely to r~peat it-
self unless corrective action is taken. 
PART 1 - THE ROLE OF THE NAVY STOCK FUND 
Section 2208 of Title 10 of the United States Code estab-
lishes the existence of working capital funds within the 
Department of Defense. Within the Department of Defense 
several such funds have been established pursuant to the 
authority given in 10USC2208, one of which is the Navy Stock 
Fund. 
"The Navy Stock Fund is technically a 'pool of 
money appropriated from the General Fund of the 
United States and held on the books of the 
Treasury Department •••• • This is rather like 
describing an iceberg as that small portion of 
a floating mass of ice that is visible above 
the surface of th e water. Various categories 
of material that have been purchased from 'the 
fund' would be hidden, like the submerged por-
tion of an iceberg, by such a strict definition. 
These stores of material just referred to are 
carried in a suspense account known as the Navy 
Stock Account until needed by consumer activi-
ties. Both the Navy Stock Fund cash and the 
Navy Stock Account inventories combine to make 
up the working capital of a supply management 
co ncept that 'represents an effort to provide 
room for business management within the frame-
work of a military organization. 1111 
The purpose of the Navy Stock Fund (NSF), hereafter meant 
to include the total concept of stock fund cash and stock ac-
count inventories, is to provide a simplified and efficient 
means of managing, financing, controlling and accounting for 
2 
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the material applicable to the NSF style of management. This 
Q purpose is achieved by: 
1. Operating on a revolving fund concept to ensure 
"funds will be provided automatically for replenishment of 
stocks 2through reimbursement to the stock fund for material sold." 
0 2. Limiting the material included in the NSF to that 
which lends itself to the type management outlined, such 
that, "there is a recurring demand for the items of any 
category of material held by a stock fund so that the stock 
fund investment therein does not become frozen. 113 
3. Controlling the use of the fund to ensure "this use 
of the fund will provide an automatic incentive for limitation 
of inventory levels, better balanced inventories, and limita-
tions of 4procurement requirements of peacetime operating stocks." 
Thus, the NSF is intended to cover a selected category of 
material in a revolving fund concept. The total working capi-
tal in the fund is designed to be static with internal fluctua-
tions between cash and assets being the dynamic factor. In 
this setting one of the most important aspects of the fund is 
the necessity that it operate on a break-even basis. 
"The principle followed in the conduct of stock 
funds is similar to a commercial merchandising 
enterprise, except that there is no sales promo-
tion, and operations are conducted on a break-
even basis."5 
In order to achieve break-even operation the fund must not 
only replenish itself for the direct cost of material pro-
cured, but it must also provide additional revenue to recover 
certain indirect costs associated with the operation of the 
fund. Thus, theoretically, the fund provides the cash used 
to procure the material assets which are sold to customers. 
These sales in turn provide the cash to replenish the fund and 
the cycle repeats itself. 
A revolving fund activity might, very simply, be compared 
to a small town retail store where the retailer is only inter-
ested in recovering costs plus a small salary to cover personal 
expenses. The store requires some amount of initial investment 
to buy goods, which, as long as they sell, will generate sales 
and hence cash for more material. But what would happen if 
another player was added to complicate this simple situation? 
3 
Suppose the retailer did not have the capital to initiate 
business so he entered into an agreement with a local banker 
to obt ain his initial fund of capital . In order to control O 
his investment, however, the banker insisted all sales reve-
nue be turned over to him and that he be responsib l e for 
providing funds to the retailer as required to rep l enish 
stocks~ but only in amounts comparable to the store's sales. 
Furthermore, the banker would not allow any changes in pric~~ 
without his approval since he suspected any such changes 
would create an unfavorable situation in the town. Finally, 0 
in order to establish a routine replenishment period which 
would minimize his administrative burden, the banker intended 
to replenish the retailer's funds only quarterly. The retailer 
reluctantly agreed. 
After receipt of his initial material orders things 
seemed to be going fine for the retailer. Material was sell~ 
ing, cash was flowing back through the banker for new pur-
chases. Gradually, however, the picture began to change. 
The retailer realized that his costs were increasing but 
since his prices were fixed, he was unable to recove r all 
these costs through sales. How could he face the banker 
with this problem? 
In this situation the beauty of a revolving fund has been 
lost. The retailer has little control over the maintenance 
of the fund since the banker controls the "purse strings." 
The banker, on the other hand, has not had time to analyze 
the retailer's problem and cannot possibly see why sales will 
not cover costs. 
The real world view of the NSF is now beginning to sur-
face . The inventory control point (ICP) is the real retailer 
of the system, spending stock fund dollars to buy material 
and position i t at various stock points within the supply 
system. NSF customers eventually buy the material and pro-
vide sales dollars to replenish the fund from their operating 
budgets. Examination of the flow of these dollars begins to 
reveal some of the difficulties inherent in NSF operations. 
Instead of returning to the ICP for recycling, the dollars 
flow back to the fund controlled by NAVCOMPT, where they are 
held in suspense. The ICP's funding requirements are filled 
only through a formal budgeting procedure whi ch not only 
involves NAVCOMPT but also NAVSUP. 
The point of this discussion hinges on the two main fac-
tors of successful stock fund operations: timing and pricing. 
Prices must not only be sufficient to generate the "break-




flexible enough to react to changes in the cost elements which 
O they also must support. Equally important is management's 
ability to react to these changes in a timely fashion. Since 
considerable procurement lead time is involved in obtaining 
material for fleet operations, every delay in the ICP's ability 
to react to changes generates a "not in stock" situation. The 
longer the delay, the more significant the "stock out." 
0 The intent of this analysis is to examine NSF pricing 
policy and its effectiveness in providing the "break-even" 
sales essential to stock fund operations. Timing will play a 
significant role in this discussion since ICPs do not have 
complete authority to adjust prices as required without approv-
al from higher authority. The sales complications which arise 
from the funding roles played by NAVCOMPT and NAVSUP will not 
be considered as well as other inherent NSF problem areas 
which impact on sales determinations (e.g., material trans-
fers to special accounting class ships, sales reporting pro-
cedures, slow moving inventories, etc.). These restrictions 
are not intended to minimize the importance of these factors 
in influencing sales; on the contrary, each area could undoubt-
edly be the topic of a similar analysis. However, since their 
impact on pricing as it is considered in this analysis is 
minimal, they will not be considered. 
PART II - TRANSFER PRICING IN THE NAVY TODAY 
Transfer pricing in the Navy revolves around the concept 
of the "standard price. 11 The importance of the standard price 
is readily apparent since it represents the medium through 
which the fund is replenished, sales. Without an effective 
pricing procedure, therefore, the Navy Stock Fund as a whole 
cannot operate efficiently. 
A standard price is assigned each item carried in the 
NSF inventory. This price is intended to include the follow-
ing elements: 
1. The current market or procurement cost of the item 
at the time the price was established. 
2. A surcharge to compensate the stock fund for all 
normal net losses on current procurements and for authorized 
expenses, which include: 
a. Estimated net stock losses on current procurement 
such as pilferage, excess and physical inventory shortages; 
5 
b. Estimated net stock losses on damage, deteriora-
tion and obsolescence; 
c. Transportatio n costs. 6 
currently, the NSF surcharge is set at 10% of procurement cost 
(3% material losses, 4% obsolescence and 3% transportation). 
Before examining the effectiveness of the surcharge rate 0 
in recovering "all normal net losses on current procurements 
and for authorized expenses," it is necessary t o examine the 
determination of that element upon which the surcharge is ap-
plied, the procurement cost. Since procurements of NSF materi-
al are often made at various prices, depending primarily on 
urgency and quantity of individual buys, some procedure must 
exist for weighing these various "replacement prices" to arrive 
at a stable standard price. The procedure utilized is one 
portion of the Uniform Inventory Control Point (UICP) program 
known as G02 and is outlined in Figure l. When a buy (either 
stock, routine procurements of material to be positioned at 
stock points for future requirements; or spot, emergency ~ro-
curement of material required for immediate customer use) is 
finalized, UICP files are loaded with current procurement 
data, including the new replacement price, and G02 is triggered. 
Examination of Figure l reveals one of the first problem 
areas in the computation of standard prices, the treatment of 
spot buy replacement prices. If the current buy is a stock 
buy, any former spot buy costs, regardless of the quantity, 
are ignored in the computation of the new standard price. 
This procedure tends to discount the high cost of spot buys 
(a study done in November 1973 at the Navy Ships Parts Control 
Center (SPCC) estimated the impact of non-utilization of spot 
buy prices in such instances as 30%; i.e., a price computed 
utilizing the average of the stock and most recent spot buy 
instead of the stock alone would have yielded prices 30% 
higher). Since spot procurements of items for which standard 
prices are computed repr e sent close to 8% of SPCC's total 
NSF stock and spot buys, this differential undoubtedly has an 8 
impact on the 11break-even 11 capability of the NSF. 
Examination of the i mpact of spot buy costs on the NSF 
leads to another problem area related to actions taken by 
the ICP in support of emergency requirements which is not 
covered by the standard price, cannibalization costs. 
Cannibalization costs r e sult when an emergency requirement 
cannot be satisfied within the required time frame without 
removing the required item from a next higher assembly or 
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removal and replacement is charged to the NSF but no allow-
ance is made for this cost in the computation of the standard 
price. Therefore, once again funds are leaving the NSF in 
support of customer requirements without being recovered in 
sales (at SPCC cannibalization costs for the first eight 
months of Fiscal Year 1975 reached $120,987; although this re-
presents a relatively small portion of the SPCC Fiscal Year 
1975 NSF budget, it does represent another unaccounted for 
drain on NSF funds). 
A third area providing a drain on NSF funds is Level I 
inspection and certification costs. Level I material repre-
sents critical items for fleet support which, due primarily 
to their impact on the mission of the ship, require special 
certification and inspection procedures. Some of these costs, 
those associated with contractor test and certification, are 
included in the contract or replacement price. However, Navy 
conducted tests, which are funded by the ICP through the NSF, 
are not included and hence are not considered in the standard 
price charged the customer (at SPCC these costs approach 
$1,000,000 annually). 
Thus, three distinct areas (spot buy, cannibalization and 
Level I costs) have been identified which, although directly 
related to normal ICP operations in support of customer re-
quirements, are not completely covered in the determination 
of standard prices. The question which comes to mind is, 
how well does the 10% surcharge cover the cost of the three 
areas which it is designed to cover (stock losses, obsolescence, 
and transportation)? Perhaps the surcharge generates excess 
funds which will cover the three missing areas mentioned above. 
To explore this possibility it is necessary to examine the NSF 
purchase variance account. 
Before considering the actual purchase variance figures, 
some appreciation as to the reliability of these figures must 
be acquired. NSF purchase variance is computed from data pro-
vided in monthly Financial Inventory Reports (FIR) submitted 
0 
0 
by Navy Stock Points. In order to determine a variance, 
0
0 
stock points must know both the standard price and the replace-
ment price of the items received for stocking. Unfortunately, 
this information is not always available since material is 
frequently received at stock points without cost information 
provided by the contractor. In such an event a purchase 
variance is not computed, thus excluding a significant amount 
of data from the variance computations. Rather than repre-
senting the total variance between cost and standard, it 
more closely represents a sample variance, assuming the ob-
servations are random and no particular category of material 






Returning to the question of the surcharge's effective-
ness in covering costs, an examination of purchase variance 
for SPCC NSF material reveals a net purchase variance loss of 
1% for Fiscal Year 1974. If the surcharge was operating ef-
fectively in recovering transportation, material loss, and 
obsolescence costs alone the purchase variance would show a 
net gain of 10% (in fact, even this 10% target is understated 
since data for the past three years show SPCC costs averaging 
12.5%; 2.7% transportation, 3.5% material loss, and 6.3% ob-
solescence). Consequently, not only is the NSF being drained 
by spot buy, cannibalization, and Level I inspection costs, 
but it is also not recovering the costs it is designed to 
cover. The net effect of these factors is significant. 
Annually, they approach the following percentages: 
Surcharge losses 
Purchase variance losses 
Cannibalization losses 
Level I inspection losses 
Spot buy premium losses 







Thus, the magnitude of the total loss to the NSF indi-
cates a serious problem at the ICP level. Since NAVCOMPT/NAVSUP 
control surcharge rates, the ICPs do not have the authority to 
take action to recover losses. Therefore, sales figures con-
sistently understate ICP requirements. And since ICPs are 
routinely funded on the basis of sales, a cycle is created of 
diminishing funds, diminishing sales, diminishing funds, etc. 
The gravity of this situation can best be appreciated by re-
viewing the circumstances which occurred at SPccB during Fiscal 
Year 1974. The significance of timing begins to play a major 
role at this point as it becomes evident how slowly the system 
reacts to changes in the environment. 
At the beginning of Fiscal Year 1974, SPCC was granted 
an annual NSF budget of approximately $80,000,000. Standard 
prices had recently been updated from the previous year's 
business (ICPs were only allowed to change prices annually} 
and the normal business cycle began. Since losses from trans-
portation, material loss and obsolescence had reached 42.4% 
in Fiscal Year 1973, a sizeable sales shortfall had occurred 
which greatly reduced the funds available in Fiscal Year 1974. 
By the second quarter of the fiscal year, the full impact of 
the energy crisis hit SPCC; procurement lead time increased 
and costs spiraled (average procurement lead times were to 
increase approximately 127 days and costs by over 17% within 
the next six months). SPCC was then faced with a serious 
9 
problem; increased costs could not be passed on to the custom-
er since standard prices could not be changed, yet more NSF 0 . funding was required to counteract the effects of the increas-
ing lead times and costs. The inevitable happened, SPCC ex-
pended all available funds and was forced, in essence, to halt 
operations until normal budgeting procedures could provide 
more NSF funds. For four months virtually no routine procure-
ments were initiated by SPCC. During Fiscal Year 1974 effect-
iveness dropped 10.7% while backorders increased 67.8%. Faced 0 
with this situation the natural question is, why? Why were 
prices not updated? Why was the surcharge not increased? The 
answer rests in those activities other than ICPs upon which 
standard pricing has the greatest impact, the fleet! 
It is now possible to gain an appreciation for the full 
impact of standard pricing in the Navy. Not only do standard 
prices determine the sales generated within t he NSF but they 
also determine the amount of material individual fleet units 
(customers) can afford to buy. Historically, funding decisions 
have favored the customer. For example, i n view of continued 
funding reductions since the Vietnam war effort peaked in 1972, 
the surcharge rate was reduced 5% per year from 20% to the 10% 
now in effect. This action enabled fleet units to buy the 
same material with less funds while placing a severe strain on 
ICP operations. The net result was deterioration of fleet 
support levels. 
Fleet requirements also benefitted from a change in the 
policy regarding price revision frequency in Fiscal Year 1974. 
Prior to that time prices were updated on an "as required" 
basis, but in Fiscal Year 1974 were only allowed on an annual 
basis. As a result of the funding drain this policy put on 
the NSF and the subsequent reduction in support levels, this 
policy was reversed in Fiscal Year 1975, returning it to an 
"as required" basis. The fleet's response to the current 
policy is now forci ng consideration of another reversal in 
the price revision frequency policy and a possible increase 
in the overall surcharge rate. It is difficult to comprehend 0 
why a thorough analysis has not been conducted to resolve this U 
problem once and for all. 
PART III - ALTERNATIVE METHODS 
Seven distinct areas of cost have been considered in this 
analysis: 
1. Direct material 





3. Material losses (gains) 
4. Obsolescence 
5. Spot buy premiums (costs over direct material at 
standard) 
6. Cannibalization 
7. Level I inspection and certification 
The first four costs as well as a portion of the fifth 
are currently considered, although not adequately, in the 
computation of standard prices. The questions remain, should 
all costs be considered in the computation of standard prices? 
And if so, to what degree? 
Two factors indicate the answer to the first question is 
yes. First, the fact which was discussed earlier; in a stock 
fund, 11 •••• operations are conducted on a break-even basis." 
And second, the fact that DOD Instruction 7420.1 states, 11the 
surcharges included in the standard prices for losses and 
authorized expenses are for the purpose of recovering estimated 
net stock losses on current procurements such as pilferage, 
damage, deterioration, obsolescence, excess, physical inventory 
shortage~, losses on sales at reduced prices, and similar 
losses." Therefore, since cost recovery is not restricted to 
the first four costs listed above and since by design a stock 
fund should strive to break even, it follows that all indirect 
costs charged to the NSF should be considered in standard 
price computations. 
The question regarding the degree to which these costs 
should be considered becomes more difficult to answer. If all 
costs were covered 100% in standard price computations, ICPs 
would, in essence, have a 11blank check" and the advantage 
would shift from the fleet to the ICP, undoubtedly to reverse 
again at some point in the future. The question is, is there 
a middle ground where ICPs can be controlled and yet standard 
pricing procedures can become more realistic? Two factors im-
pact on the answer to this question: the measurement of costs 
and the treatment of these costs. 
As discussed earlier, considerable doubt exists over the 
accuracy of current cost measurement, especially with respect 
to the variance amount. 
"Properly used variances serve as a useful tool of 
management. Variances are red flags to warn that 
11 
J 
events are not following a predetermined pattern. 
They separate the expected from the unexpected and 
caution that off normal conditions affecting profit 
and loss exist and that managerial action is called 
for. 1110 
However, in the Navy's case little, if any, managerial 
action is taken in response to major fluctuations in this 
"early warning" account. The reliability of the data is un-
doubtedly an influential factor in this case. Is variance 
measurement at the Stock Point Level the most accurate method 
available? Since Stock Points have no responsibility for 
costs associated with procurement, they have no real motiva-
tion for accuracy in cost accumulation. Logically speaking, 
the ICP is the activity most directly concerned with the costs 
of a contract and since the ICP is also the contracting activi-
ty it is reasonable to expect accurate and complete cost data 
at that level. Similarly, ICPs have access to disposal (ob-
solescence) and material loss costs currently reported in Stock 
Point FIR reports. And, finally, ICPs are the sole collection 
points for cost data relating to spot buy premiums, cannibali-
zation costs, and Level I inspection and certification costs. 
Although the impact of changing the central cost collection 
point from the Stock Point to the ICP was not thoroughly 
examined in conjunction with this analysis, the evidence 
supports the fact that such action may be advisable in an ef-
fort to improve cost collection accuracy (assuming, of course, 
this data would be utilized in managerial decision-making). 
The treatment of indirect costs in the computation of 
standard prices remains an undecided issue. Direct material, 
transportation, material loss and obsolescence costs are 
c urrently included as a portion of the surcharge while spot 
buy, cannibalization and Level I costs are not included at all. 
The treatment of these costs becomes a very sensitive issue due 
to their impact on the fleet. Any change to standard prices 
without an equivalent change in operational funding will be met 
with massive resistance. So much so that simultaneous changes 
in both areas are a necessity if any change is made at all! 
Additionally, standard prices must remain relatively stable 
over a reasonable period of time (usually throughout the fis-
cal year). This is not desirable from the ICP's point of 
view; however, unless this is the case the impact on fleet 
budgeting would be monumental (a small ship with an annual 
budget under $100,000 cannot absorb routine price changes of 
any significance without additional funding}. As a result of 
these "boundary conditions 11 any procedure for computing stand-
ard prices which differs from the current method must provide 







Returning to the treatment of indirect costs, specifical-
ly spot buy, cannibalization and Level I costs, several alter-
natives are available in handling their support (because of 
their similarity, spot buy premium and cannibalization costs 
will be considered together; both represent costs of emergency 
action taken in support of individual customer requirements): 
1. Spot buy and cannibalization cost treatment: 
a. Charge the customer with all spot buy costs in 
excess of standard - this action would minimize ICP concern 
over operational efficiency, since any time material was not 
available in the system it could be spot procured at no cost 
to the ICP. Backorders would undoubtedly disappear and the 
cost to the customer and the Navy as a whole would increase 
significantly (the "blank check" situation mentioned earlier). 
The advantage would be in lead time reduction. The ICP would 
have no reason to hold back requirements due to a lack of 
funds; therefore, immediate procurement would be initiated 
rather than a lengthy period on the backorder file. Addi-
tionally, customers would be encouraged to carefully screen 
emergency requirements since their funds would be at stake. 
b. Revise standard prices giving full weight to 
spot buy costs - Once again the ICP benefits at the customer's 
loss. Additionally, the customer whose requisition was spot 
procured would be charged the old standard price and the next 
customer to order the material would pay the higher price ad-
justed for the spot buy. As is currently the case, under 
this system the customer has no incentive to control emer-
gency requirements and therefore would be unlikely to reduce 
spending (the customer would merely complain of the high 
prices). 
c. Treat spot buy costs as a cost of operation and 
include an appropriate percentage in the surcharge rate -
this action could be considered a middle ground to the two 
previous proposals. All customers would pay an increased 
amount across the board while the ICP could be controlled 
through regulation of the spot buy percentage by higher 
authority. However, once again, no incentive would exist for 
customer control of spot buy costs since these costs would be 
spread across all prices. 
d. Originate a system of customer authorization of 
spot buy costs - this would involve, for example, type 
conunander approval of all fleet requisitions authorized for 
spot procurement. Once authorized, the ICP would charge the 
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excess over standard to a special spot buy fund controlled by 
the type commander. Although this alternative proposes an 
administrative burden it has considerable appeal from a cost 
savings standpoint. The customer is forced to control waste-
ful spending on "false" emergencies and the ICP is forced to 
operate efficiently in providing overall fleet support. 
e. Maintain the current system - as previously dis-
cussed, this alterna t ive is unacceptable without considerable 
revision of current funding procedures. Under this "base 
caseu ICPs are under pressure to fill emergency requirements. 
This leads to restriction of funds for routine stock replen-
ishment, loss of sales, and hence worsening overall support. 
The customer has no incentive to control priority abuses and 
in fact continually abuses them in order to obtain material 
in the shortest time f rame. The one advantage, of course, is 
that no shake up of the current system is necessary. 
f. Fund spot buy costs separately - this alternative 
would eliminate the ICP's dilemma of reserving funds for spot 
procurement at the cost of stock buys; however, it would not 
control the customer's abuse of system priorities. The problem 
would merely shift one level higher, presumably to NAVSUP. 
2. Level I inspection and certification costs - these 
costs differ from spot buy and cannibalization costs since 
they are associated with each item of Level I material pro-
cured by the supply system. In this sense they could be con-
sidered a portion of direct material cost; however, current 
procedures do not identify the costs associated with individual 
items, only the cumulative costs of inspection and certifica-
tion. To initiate such a system would appear to be an unneces-
sary administrative burden; other alternatives exist: 
a. Maintain the current system - once again, other 
than minimizing turmoil, this alternative is unacceptable 
since Level I costs are not considered in the current system 
and therefore represent an expenditure with no subsequent re-
imbursement. 
b. Fund Level I inspection and certification costs 
separately - this alternative i s an acceptable solution; how-
ever, it appears somewhat impractical. Since these costs are 
directly associated wi th the rout i ne procurement of Level I 
material it follows they do not warrant an individual account-








c. Treat Level I costs as a cost of operation and 
include an appropriate percentage in the surcharge rate -
this action, if applied 11across the board" would charge all 
customers the cost of Level I inspection and certification. 
Since lesi:; than 1% of the over 320,000 NSF items carried at 
SPCC are Level I items, this procedure does not appear war-
ranted, especially in view of the fact that ships requiring 
Level I material normally have better funding support than 
ships without. This procedure would be feasible, however, if 
this additional surcharge percentage were only applied to 
Level I material. 
PART IV - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although sufficient indications of stock fund inadequacy 
have existed for some time, little action has been initiated 
to identify and eliminate these inadequacies. The reluctance 
to take such action has stenuned primarily from the austere 
funding climate with which the Navy has been faced in the re-
cent past. The feeling of "hopelessness" which such a climate 
creates is indeed unfortunate since historically, well docu-
mented funding inadequacies have been corrected as evidenced 
by the energy crisis costs mentioned earlier. The longer in-
adequacies are left to exist the more difficult it w~ll be-
come to correct them and the more the system will suffer from 
a lack of proper support. 
This study does not provide the answer to the supply sys-
tem funding problems. However, it does provide insight into 
the gravity of the situation and the importance of a complete 
analysis. It is evident an adequate cost control system does 
not exist and that that which does exist is marginal at best. 
It is also evident that little use of cost data is being made 
in managerial decision making, undoubtedly due to its question-
able nature. Both of these conditions must be altered. It is 
unlikely the pressure to cut defense expenditures will subside 
in the near future; it is more likely it will continue to in-
crease. In view of this situation, it is imperative that ICPs 
monitor the magnitude of all NSF costs if for no other reason 
than "self defense." Although Level I and cannibalization 
costs are being measured, no current procedure exists to meas-
ure the cost over standard of spot buys (spot buy premium 
costs). It is essential that such a procedure be originated 
since spot buy costs are the most significant of the three. 
Having identified the costs associated with NSF operation 
it is equally important these costs be measured in the most 
accurate method available. The preliminary analysis provided 
in this study indicates current procedures are inadequate. 
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The evidence indicates further analysis is required to deter-
mine if the measurement of material losses and obsolescence 
at the stock point level is the most appropriate method. 
Since disposal is cont r olled at the ICP level and the supply 
system•s centralized inventory accounts are the responsibility 
of the ICP, it appears the ICP would provide the more appro-
priate level for cost control in this area. Such action might 
provide the additional benefit of more accurate inventory ac-
counts if these costs were reconciled with stock balances. 
Once all costs have been identified and measured the in-
adequacies of the current system highlighted in this analysis 
will become evident. At that point it will be necessary to 
thoroughly analyze the alternatives presented above as well as 
others which may be discovered. The results of this study in-
dicate close attention should be paid to the alternatives of 
Level I i nspection and certification costs as a percentage 
mark-on over all Level I material (given that these costs 
cannot reasonably be allocated on an individual basis as part 
of the direct material cost} an d treating spot buy premiums 
and cannibalization costs under a customer authorization pro-
cedure. The degree to which formal authorization of spot buys 
would be required would have to be considered before a f i nal 
policy was initiated (e.g., ICPs might be granted authority to 
automatically spot buy the most urgent requirements (e.g . , 
C3/C4 CASREPTS) with all others requiring type commander 
approval). The important point to remember is that no such 
action be taken until all costs have been identified and 
measured and all alternatives have been carefully considered. 
Once the method of treatment of all costs has been deter-
mined, the final step is cost control. An effective purchase 
variance procedure should be adequate to monitor the effective-
ness of the surcharge in replenishing the fund and in measur-
ing ICP effectiveness. However, current procedures will not 
provide such a system. Serious consideration should be given 
to the possibility of measuring variance percentages at the 
ICP level instead of the stock point level as previously men-
tioned. Such a system would provide more reliable cost measure-
ment and increase the control over ICPs . As costs fluctuate 
from standard, the causes of such fluctuations can be local-
ized as well as ident i fied . Once identified, causes can be 
determined and appropriate action taken . Finally, as previ-
ously discussed, any decision to alter the current pricing 
procedure must include an appropriate adjustment in fleet 






The conclusions drawn above may appear somewhat utopian. 
The point is not that the solution is necessarily in this 
analysis, only that the need exists for a thorough analysis. 
It is obvious to the author that considerable deficiencies 
exist in the current operation and control of the NSF. In 
short, the current transfer pricing system is not providing 
the "break-even" support for which it was designed. Consider-
ing the present thrust to expand the universe of material in-
cluded within the NSF, it is increasingly important that 
immediate action be taken. Therefore, it is recommended that a 
comprehensive study be initiated into the areas covered in 
this analysis at the earliest possible opportunity. 
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Youth As A Divergent Culture 
In Society And The Navy 
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Introduction 
The Navy is made up of individuals that represent many 
divergent cultures. These cultures exist both as distinct 
entities, called subcultures, and as part of the larger 
America n Superculture. The thread of common heritage and 
experience of all Americans, whether black, white, old , 
young, male, female , rich , or poor are exp r essed, in varying 
degrees, in the value systems of each of t he subc u ltures. 
Yet , America and the Navy seem to be experiencing a polariza-
tion between divergent subcultures, e.g., blacks are opposing 
whites , youth is opposin g the older generations, and activist 
feminists are opposing male chauvinists. 
This _paper will d i scuss the youth subculture and compare 
and contrast the values of the youth subc u lture with those 
values attributed to the mainstream American culture. Only 
through an understandin g of the cultural values o f the youth 
0 
0 
subculture ca n administrators, managers, supervisors, and 0 leaders in th e Navy (i.e. , those people who are generally (.1 
considered to be in the older generations) hope to inspire , 
positively motivate , control and retain (in the service) the 
l arge youthful segment of the Navy. 
CommandVL RobVL.t S:t.a>tley Ro.6en, USN, .1tec.ei.ved lu..6 B.A. deg/tee 61t.om 
Colu.mb~ Colle ge i n 1958, an M.S. deg.1tee in In.te1L11a.ti..ona.l A66a..llt.4 6.1tom 
The Geo.1tge WMh.ing.ton Uru.vell..6i.ty in. 1911, and an M.S. de.g1t.ee hi. Manage-




Values and Cultures 
It is difficult to discern the value orientation of naval 
personnel because they are members of a large organization that 
has a strict and limiting behavior code. Whether implicit or 
explicit, the pervasive influence of the institutional authori-
ty of the military organization is felt by every member of the 
organization. The degree of institutional control imposed up-
on individuals varies by organization, billet, and rank or 
rate.l 
Naval rules, regulations, and behavior codes are used to 
impose a uniform behavioral pattern upon naval personnel. 
Deviant behavior is punished and conformity is rewarded. Con-
formity in the past was easier to obtain because the civilian 
society from which military men were drawn was less polarized, 
i.e., more homogeneous in cultural values than contemporary 
America. 
Military personnel feel especially inhibited from express-
ing cultural values considered deviant from the perceived 
military norm while in uniform, and to a lesser degree when 
on their off-hours or own time. Therefore, even though some 
naval personnel espouse subcultural values similar to · their 
civilian counterparts, it is much more difficult to discern 
what these values are, than it is for the individuals in the 
civilian community who espouse similar values. Civilian life 
styles and behavior provide a wealth of information on their 
cultural values. 
A value is " .•. a type of belief that concerns how one 
ought or ought not to act (e.g., with sincerity and honesty) 
or the go,ls one is trying to obtain (e.g., happiness, free-
dom) ••• 11 Another definition of values more appropriate to 
the analytical methodology in this paper was stated by Dr . 
Ralph H. Gabriel, Sterling Professor of History, Emeritus, at 
Yale University: 
A value is an ideal, a paradigm setting forth a de-
sired and esteemed possible social reality . In es-
sence values are beliefs--beliefs that the idealized 
ways of living and acting are the best ways for the 
society. Because values are beliefs, they serve to 
inspire the members of the society to act in the 
approved ways. Because values are ideal pictures, 
they provide a means 0£ judging the quality of 3 actual behavior. In this role they become standards. 
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Using this definition, it will be possible to look at 
the expressed beliefs and the actions or behavior of the 
youth s u bculture and to then determine 4 the divergent culture's idealized, "Picture of the good life." 
To speak of the youth subculture as a single homogeneous 
entity is misleading since it is made up of numerous subcul-
tures ranging over a broad continuum of value orientations. 
Theodore Roszak stated : 
It strikes me as obvious beyond dispute that the 
interests of our college-age and adolescent young 
in the psychology of alienation, oriental mysticism, 
psychedelic drugs and communitarian experiments 
comprise a cultural constellation that radically 
diverges from values and assumptions that have been 
in the mainstream of our society at least since tge 
Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century. 
The "Cultural constellation " that Roszak speaks of is the 
large number of subcultures that exist within the youth cul-
ture of America today . The often heard credo of contemporary 
American youth, "Do your own thing," has led to a diversity 
of subcults that makes description and analysis difficult. 
Alvin Toffler sees the divergence of youth's values as a 
"Subcult explosion": 
Today the hammerblows of the super-industrial revolu-
tio n are literally splintering the society. We are 
multiplying these social enclaves, tribes and mini-
cults among us almost as fast as we are multiplying 
automotive options. The same destandardizing forces 
that make for greater individual choice with respect 
to products and cultural wares are also destandardiz-
ing our social structures. This is why, seemingly 
overnight, new subcults like the hippies burst into 
being . We are, in fact, living through a "subcult 
explosion. 11 6 
Richard E. Peterson identifies eight student types dis-
tinguishable in terms of their dominant value commitment. 
Arranged in order of acceptance to rejection of American 
values and institutions, these are: Vocationalists, Pro-
fessionalists, Collegiates, Ritualists 1 Academics, Intel-lectuals, Left-Activists, and Hippies . Within the Hippie 
subculture alone, J. R. Howard identifies four distinct 
character types: The Visionaries, The Freakg and the Heads, 







proliferation of subcults is not static and indications are 
that it will continue in the future. 
There are many analysts that believe that the majority 
of the youth in America are not in a divergent culture but 
rather are conformists to the mainstream American culture. 
For example: 
Life recently [1970] commissioned Louis Harris 
anaAssociates to interview a national cross sec-
tion of the 26 million Americans who are between 
the ages of 15 and 21. Their views on a broad 
range of social questions are remarkably moderate, 
even conservative. In sum, they describe a 
rather tolerant, relaxed group whose attitudes 
and expectations on a great many subjects differ 
very little from their parents. As Harris reports, 
"The majority of youth listens to the rhetoric of 
dissent, picks what it wants, then slowly weaves 
it into the dominant social pattern."9 
The truth probably lies somewhere between the view of 
Roszak, Toffler, et. al . , and the views of the Louis Harris 
group. It would seem that there are numerous subcultures ex-
tending over a continuum ranging from those youth in the 
conformist group to those youth in the alienated-youth group 
who represent rejection of mainstream American values. 
As has already been stated, naval personnel do not gen-
erally exhibit behavior inconsistent with mainstream values 
even if they hold divergent beliefs. So to determine the 
nature of any divergent values that do exist, one must look 
at the civilian population. But, amidst the enormous diversi-
ty of amorphous subcults in contemporary America, how can the 
basic values of American youth be determined? The answer is 
seen partly through public opinion polls, partly through ob-
servation of youth's overt actions, and partly through an 
analysis of youth's life styles and institutions. 
What an individual says and what he does both reflect his 
attitudes, expectations, and basic values. The problem of 
determining values is complicated by the fact that all too 
often people will say that they believe in a certain set of 
values and then take actions that reflect a different set of 
values. This paradox in human behavior occasionally invali-
dates the results of public opinion polls. The classic politi-
cal example was the Truman victory over Dewey in the 1948 
Presidential election where the majority of the voting public 
in the United States indicated, in the Gallup public opinion 
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polls, that they were going to vote for Dewey (49 . 5% to 44.5%) 
and then voted for Truman (49 . 8% to 45.4%) _lo 
The following example shows that actions do not always 
reflect true basic values. During the 1965 race riots in the 
Los Angeles suburb of Watts, there occurred in addition to 
extensive property damage, deaths, and numerous injuries, a 
great amount of looting of private business establishments. 
The looting was not restricted to the active rioters but was 
carried on by many of the local residents who had not partici-
pated in the riots. The actions of the latter group give the 
impression that their basic values included a lack of respect 
for the law. This was probably true in some cases, but after 
the riots had died down, many looters were observed returning 
the goods taken during the riots (not for exchange). They 
were basically good law-abiding citizens who had been carried 
away with the spirit of lawlessness that prevailed during the 
riots, i.e., they were the victims of 11mob psychology. 11 Dur-
ing times of crisis or periods of high tensio ns, when emotions 
are charged and tempers short, the actions of people acting en 
masse do no t always accurately reflect the basic values of the 
individuals involved in the mass action. 
A previously mentioned Louis Harris poll conducted for 
LIFE Magazine late in 1970 was designed to find out, "What 
will become of this country when the young generation comes 
of age and takes over? 1111 A national cross section of the 26 
million Americans between the ages of 15 and 21 was inter-
viewed. The results of the survey are expressed as follows : 
"People who expect a cataclysmic rejection of traditions, 
mores and institutions are in for a shock: the young wouldn't 
overturn society even if they could. Most of them are much 
too satisfied with it as it is. "12 Harris admitted that, 
"Within the cross section, college students on almost every 
issue are strikingly more skeptical and progressive than their 
younger brothers and sisters in high school. 11 13 
The results of this poll seem valid for the age group sur-
0 
0 
veyed; but when compared with other polls, as will shortly be 8 
seen, the general conclusions that Harris has drawn are overly 
optimistic. The 15 to 21 year olds that Harris surveyed were, 
for the most part, still unde r parental influence . This would 
account for the strong co i ncidence between their values and 
their parents' mainstream values. The fact that the older 
youth, the college students, were found to hold more skeptical, 
progressive, and liberal views indicates that with freedom 
from parental control, youth is more likely to modify, and in 




Harris underestimates the significance of this older 
more liberal group and its possible future impact on society. 
Harris' poll is useful in that it provides indications of 
some of the mainstream values of America. 
A public opinion poll, conducted in October 1968 by 
Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., for FORTUNE Magazine was" ••• de-
signed to elicit their [youth's] basic values and their be-
liefs about controversial aspects of U.S. society today. 1114 
A representative cross section of the 23 million American 
youths between the ages of 18 and 24, both college and non-
college, were surveyed. The results of the survey showed a 
predictable difference in attitudes between the college and 
non-college youths. The non-college youths were much more 
conservative in their attitudes and tended to conform more 
to mainstream value systems than their liberal college counter-
parts. 
Both the Harris poll and the Yankelovich poll found that 
the majority of youth still supported the mainstream cultural 
values of the American society. They both also noted that 
there were minority dissident groups within the cross section 
of youths surveyed and that the dissident youths held values 
that were more liberal and progressive than the values held 
by the majority. And, they both agreed that the dissident 
groups were comprised primarily of college students or college 
graduates. The major point of divergence in the findings of 
the two polls concerns the significance attached to the poten-
tial influence that the dissident groups will have on the fu-
ture of America. Harris and LIFE dismiss the dissidents as a 
minority that will contribute""""tc,change; but th 5y do not fore-cast revolutionary change or a radical future. 1 FORTUNE and 
Yankelovich, on the other hand, state that, " •.. behind the 
small and highly visible activist minority [2% of all college 
students] is a much larger and generally 'invisible' minority 
of forerunners [40% of all college students] holding similar 
dissident attitudes. 1116 The name, "Forerunners," was chosen 
because FORTUNE felt that the attitudes and values of this 
group will become more prevalent in the future and will there-
fore have an increasingly significant impact on both the 
manner in which society will be changed and the direction 
that the change will take.17 
The attitudes expressed in the Harris and Yankelovich 
polls indicate that there is a value system extant that runs 
counter to the mainstream American value system. The nature 
or direction of this countercultural value system seems easily 
discernible from the polls and will be discussed below but 
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the intensity or depth of feeling and commitment to the values 
professed is not readily apparent.* Theodore Roszak has 
stated : 0 
Much of what i s most valuable in the counter cul-
ture does not find its way into l iterate expres-
sion - a fact well wor th bearing in mind if one 
wants to achi e ve any decent understanding especi-
ally of what the more hip-bohemian young are up O 
to. One is apt to find out more about their 
ways by paying attention to posters, buttons, 
fashions of dress a nd dance - and especially to 
the pop music , which now knits together the whole 
thirteen to thirty age group.l9 
As Roszak suggests, a study of the actions a nd life styles 
of youth is necessary for understanding what is valuable in 
the counterculture. An analysis of y ouths' actions would in-
dicate the intensity with which they hold their value attitudes 
and an analysis of their life styles would reveal their commit-
ment to these values. Unfortunate1 26 such detailed analyses are beyond the scope of .this paper. 
From a manifesto published in a high school underground 
newspaper one can discern that some youth feel that mainstream 
American Society is not satisfying their p erceived needs which 
s e em to be centered around having fun or a good time. In order 
t o satisfy their needs, many young peo p le have tried to create 
a way of life based on alienatio~ from, and rejection of, their 
own American cultural heritage. 2 Stemen Kelman interprets 
the s ymbols of the youth subculture or counterculture as fol-
lows: 
It is the impulse to bre a k down wha t are seen as 
artificial barriers wh ich i s at the center of the 
youth culture's value system, and which explains 
much of the youth culture's political and non-
political mores. 
Young people view long hair as unruly and unin-
hibited. Closely cropped hair, held in place 
with tonic, is rigid an d stultify i ng. Mari j uana 
can be both a means of communal experience in 
*Sears and Lane have stated t hat, "The two d i mensions 
which public opinion ana l ysts most commoy§y use to describe 





itself, and, when the adult world provides an 
example of convention-bound opposition to what 
appears a harmless pleasure an occasion to pro-
test the barriers society places between people 
simply trying to "come together." The loud and 
insistent beat of rock music provides not only 
a verbal and musical language for the youth 
culture, but also a calm-shattering inducement 
to tear down inhibitions and barriers.22 
The major themes of the youth counterculture that stand 
out in the previously mentioned Yankelovich and Gallup polls, 
in youth demonstrations in youth's writing, and in youth's 
individual and communal life styles are: 1. disillusionment 
with the American dream of what the good life should be; 2. 
rejection of the institutions of the mainstream American 
culture, e.g., Nuclear Family, Democratic Government, Univer-
sity Education, Capitalistic Economy, and Western Religious 
institutions; 3. a strong belief in the necessity for and 
desirability of immediate social change; 4. the belief that 
violence is an acceptable method of affecting social change; 
5. the belief in the irrelevancy of past experience to present 
problems; 6. the insistence on the immediate gratification 
of individual desires; 7. the belief in an idealistic Utopian 
society that maximizes individual freedoms and eliminates all 
societal constraints; and 8. the common feelings of aliena-
tion, anger, frustration, fear, and loneliness that results 
from the rejection of an established way of life without hav-
ing a suitable substitute to replace it. 
Contrasted to the Utopian idealism of the counterculture 
are the more practical, yet no less idealistic, mainstream 
American values (some of which were reflected in the Harris-
LIFE poll described earlier). 
Mainstream values are organiz~~ 
upward mobility of the individual. 
17 value areas of the "American core 
values are listed in Table I. 
TABLE I 
around a belief in the 
Walter Gruen identifies 
culture cluster." These 
VALUES OF THE DOMINANT CULTURE OF AMERICA 
1. Upward mobility and role change emphasis 
2. Postponement of gratification for the future. 
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TABLE I (CONTINUED) 
3. Opti mism in one's own efforts 
4. Social extroversion 
5. External and stereotyped expression (vs. unique and 
genuine expression of feelings) 
6. Idealization of youth and beauty 
7. Lack of interest in reading and in books 
8. Conformity to community standards 
9. Desire to work for a stable, well-known organization 
10. Tight control of emotions (vs . free expression of feel-
i ngs} 
11. Concern with regularity (vs. spontaneous scheduling of 
daily routine) 
12. Cleanliness as an extreme concern (vs. functional clean-
liness) 
13. Preference for bland food 
14. Belief in romantic love (vs. love as a developi n g pro-
cess) 
15. Emphasis on activity to prevent sensual experie n ces (vs. 
enjoyment of sensual experiences) 
16. Emphasis on keeping busy (vs. enjoyment of idle time for 
its own sake) 
17. Relaxation as a health measure (vs. enjoyment of idle 
time for its own sake) 
Source: Walter Gruen, "Composition and Some Correlates 
of the American Core Culture, " Psychological Reports, 1966, 
p. 4a3-4S4. 
Roland L. Warren h~f identified 13 American values which 
are listed in Table II. Many of the values identified by 










Freedom--We must have large areas of choice available to 
each of us as to how we are going to THINK, FEEL, AND 
BEHAVE. 
2. Individualism--We have a tendency to measure GOOD & BAD 
in terms of the effect on the individual human being. 
3. Democracy--Majority rule but basic rights of minority and 
of the individual are protected. This concept applies to 
all of society's institutions. 
4. Practicality--Reflected in the status of engineers, physi-
cians and businessmen over schoolteachers, clergymen, and 
philosophers. 
5. Pecuniary evaluation--All things and people evaluated in 
monetary terms. Personal worth evokes image of money. 
6. Success--Based on Protestant Ethic which emphasized indus-
try and thrift and amassing of personal wealth. 
7. Education--Assumption that education is the answer to soci-
al problems and personal achievement and success. 
8. Science--Reliance on rationality of science to explain the 
world. 
9. Progress--Progress is possible and is necessary. Optim-
ism and Enlightenment's faith in the infinite perfect-
ability of man. 
10. Happiness--Maximization of individual enjoyment and the 
avoidance of misery. 
11. Humanitarianism--Feeling of obligation to do something 
about the less fortunate people at home and abroad. 
12. Conformity--through informal group pressures. 
13. Joining--Americans are a nation of voluntary joiners. 
I 
Source: Roland L. warren, The Community in America 
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1963). 
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It is apparent that there is a significant divergence be-
tween the value systems of mainstream America and the youth 
subculture. Utilizing a model designed by Florence R. 
Kluckhohn to i!lustrate the ranges of variability in value 
orientations, 2 this author has, in Table III, compared and 
contrasted the basic mainstream American values with the 
youth subculture's values . 
TABLE III 
BASIC VALUES 
MAINSTREAM AMERICAN VALUES YOUTH SUBCULTURE VALUES 
ON THE INNATE NATURE OF MAN* 
NEUTRAL, BOTH GOOD AND 
EVIL MUTABLE 
GOOD-IMMUTABLE 
ON MAN'S RELATIONSHIP TO NATURE AND SUPERNATURE* 
MASTERY OVER NATURE HARMONY WITH NATURE 
ON MAN'S TIME FOCUS* 
FUTURE ORIENTED PRESENT ORIENTED 
ON MAN'S RELATIONSHIP TO HUMAN ACTIVITY* 
DOING FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT BEING-IN-BECOMING 
ON MAN'S RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER MEN* 
COLLATERAL/INDIVIDUALISTIC INDIVIDUALISTIC/HUMAN-
ISTIC 
*Kluckhohn's model is composed of the five aster i sked 
sub-headings. The values indicated are Kluckhohn's variables 
but their attribution to either "Mainstream American" or to 
the "Youth Subculture" is the responsibility of this author . 
Source: Florence R. Kluckhohn, "Dominant and Variant 
Value Orientations , " in Irwin Sanders, The Community (New 







Table IV lists five basic needs of man and Freud's two 
basic drives (Instincts)--sexual and aggressive26--and then 
compares the mainstream American institutions and methods of 
meeting these needs and drives with those of the youth sub-
culture. 
TABLE IV 
SATISFACTION OF BASIC NEEDS AND DRIVE COMPARED 
BASIC NEEDS 
1. BIO-MAINTENANCE 











































MEDIA CARRIED TO 
EXTREMES OF 
PORNOGRAPHY) 
IDEALIZED - NO 
AGGRESSION. 
PRESENT AGGRESSION 
IS VENTED TOWARDS 
THE ESTABLISHMENT 
Thus far, it has been shown that in the civilian society 
there is a youthful subculture extant in America that holds 
values divergent from the mainstream American culture . Does 
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this situation exist in the Navy? An affirmative answer seems 
i ntuitively obvious to this au t hor since naval personnel were O 
drawn from the civilian society and they are part-time civi-
lians during their active duty tours. There is some empirical 
evidence , though not conclusive, that the values of the youth-
ful members of the Navy are divergent from the values of the 
older generations. 
An attitude survey on the question of "Women Aboard Navy 0 
Ships," conducted in Norfolk, Virginia, i n late 1972, indi-
cated that there was a larger difference of attitude between 
naval personnel under twenty-five and those over twenty-five 
than there was between men and women, officer and enlisted, 
college educated and non-college educated, and married and 
single classifications. One important weakness of the attitude 
survey was that there was no attempt to correlate attitude 
variances based on racial differences. 
Conclusions 
Admiral Zumwalt, the "MOD-CN0,11 recognized that younger 
naval personnel are in fact in a divergent culture and he has 
taken many actions to change the naval organization and its 
policies to accommodate them. The Army, in its recruiting 
campaign, is even proclaiming that it wants to, "Join Them." 
This author believes that as the younger generation of naval 
personnel become the older generation that they will adopt 
many of the mainstream cultural values but will also keep a 
significant nUlllber of t h eir present values and will work to 
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Introduction: 
"Public Law 91-596 - December 29, 1970 
AN ACT 
To assure safe and healthful working conditions for 
working men and women; by authorizing enforcement of 
the standards developed under the Act; by assisting 
and encouraging the States in their effort to assure 
safe and healthful working conditions; by providing 
for research, information, education and training in 
the field of occupational safety and health; and for 
other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and 
House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be 
cited as the 'Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970. 1111 
Lieutenant R~c.ha.1td C. John.6on, CEC, U.S. Navy, 1tec.ei.ved hi.6 
B.S. de.g1t.ee 61tom 011.e.gon State. Un.l.velt.h.l.ty ,l.n Vec.embe.11. 3966, 
and ltec.e.l.ved hi.h M.S . deglt.e.e. .l.n Management 61tom the Na.val 
Po.6tg1taduate Sc.hoo.t in Vec.e.mbelt 1974. 
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The above quote is the beginning of the Williams-Steiger 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, better known as 
"OSHA." In passing this law , Congress declared the purpose 
of the Act and hence the Labor Department's and OSHA's mission 
to be "to assure so f ar as possible every working man and 
woman in the nation safe and healthful working conditions and 
to preserve our human r e sources ••• "2 
This paper is written toward an audience of military 
officers and thus the presentation is broken into three main 
sections: OSHA and the Non-Federal Employer/Employee, OSHA 
and the Federal Employer/Employee, and Proposed Changes to 
OSHA Affecting the Federal Employer/Employee. The first sec-
tion is important to the military officer in that it makes 
him aware of the impact of the law outside of the Federal 
community, for example , how it impacts military contractors 
and their employees. The second section is important because 
it explains how OSHA currently affects the DOD, the officer 
himself, and the officer's employees, both civilian and mili-
tary. The third section outlines proposed changes that may 
soon become reality and may greatly change OSHA's impact as 
detailed in the second section. 
OSHA and the Non-Feder a l Employer/Employee 
Very briefly, OSHA legislation charges the U.S. Depart-
ment of La.bar with the issuance of occupational and health 
standards, the enforcement of these standards, and the deve-
lopment and maintenance of safety and health record keeping 
and reporting. OSHA covers every employer in a business who 
has one or more employees, in other words, almost everyone. 
0 
0 
The agency responsible for administering OSHA is the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the U.S. 
Department of Labor. The 11 guts 11 of OSHA is the set of na-
tional safety and health standards promulgated by the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration by publication in 
the Federal Register. The standards are legally enforceable 
regulations governing conditions, practices or operations to [} 
assure safe and healthful workplaces. The original standards 
were based on certain standards already in effect under sever-
al Federal acts and the standards of two nationally known 
organizations; American National Standards Institute and 
National Fire Protection Association.3 
The national safety and health standards are continually 
being reviewed and updated by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration. The current library of these standards 




categories - general industry, maritime and construction. New 
standards are continually being developed by an organization 
called National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH). NIOSH functions under the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare in the field of technical and medical 
research. Its applied research activities are directed at 
developing or modifying criteria for recommending occupational 
and health standards to the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration.4 
The basic responsibility of the employer under OSHA is 
compliance with the national safety and health standards in 
order to provide a workplace free from safety and health 
hazards. This involves removing or guarding all hazards 
from/at the workplace, providing safe tools and equipment in-
cluding personal safety gear, establishing or updating pro-
cedures to insure safety, informing employees of their rights 
and responsibilities under OSHA, keeping required OSHA records 
of work-related injuries and illnesses (if the employer has 
eight or more employees), reporting to OSHA each injury or 
health hazard that results in a hospitalization or fatality of 
five or more employees, and not discriminating against employ-
ees who exercise their rights under OSHA. 5 Although these 
items are easy to list, they are not simple for the employer 
to obey. Employers are subject to penalties for violation of 
the standards but safety is expensive; therefore, many employ-
ers have a natural tendency to avoid conservative safety pro-
cedures. Furthermore, because of the large volume of standards 
and the continual updating of these stagdards, many employers 
find them complex and incomprehensible. 
The employee under OSHA has the responsibility to comply 
with the applicable OSHA standards, follow all of the employ-
er's safety and health rules, wear and use prescribed protect-
ive equipment and report any hazardous conditio9s or job-
related illnesses and injuries to his employer. The law 
does not, however, provide any penalties for an employee 
failing to meet his responsibilities under the law. Some 
very important employee rights under OSHA include requesting 
OSHA to conduct an inspection of any workplace the employee 
believes to be hazardous, having the employee's name with-
held from his employer if he files a complaint and filing a 
complaint to OSHA if the employee feels he has been discrimin-
ated against because he has exercised a right under OSHA.a 
The enforcement of OSHA is based on an inspection program. 
The OSHA inspector (Compliance Safety and Health Officer) 
arrives unannounced at the workplace during the regular working 
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hours of the establishment, displays his credentials to the 
management and requests to meet with the appropriate employer 
represencative. The OSHA inspector details the purpose and 
the scope of the inspection and requests both an employer and 
an employee representative to accompany him during the "walk-
around inspection • .- During .the walkaround the inspector 
checks each work area for compliance with OSHA standards, 
using whatever testing equ i pment is appropriate for the condi-
tions. He also checks all of the employer records that are 
required under OSHA. Some violations such as blocked aisles, 
hazardous projections or unsanitary conditions can be corrected 
immediately and the employer representative may, and usually 
does, direct that they be corrected at once. During the walk-
around, any individual employee may bring to the attention of 
the inspector any condition ·he believes to be a violation. 
After the walkaround , the inspector briefs the employer on 
what he has seen and reviews probable violations and what may 
be done to eliminate them. Subsequent to the inspection, the 
Compliance Safety and Health Officer returns to his office, 
writes a report and discusses it with his area director. 
(There a9e currently 51 area offices throughout the United States.) The area director or his superiors determine what 
citations will be issued and what penalties, if any, will be 
proposed. These are mailed to the employer. 
OSHA citations and proposed penalties are similar to 
traffic violations and may be contested by the employer. The 
penalties for violations range from no penalty for a minimal 
violation such as a lack of toilet partitions to mandatory 
$1000 fine for serious violations such as absence of proper 
guards on a saw.IO Willful or repeated violat i ons may result 
in a penalty up to $10,000 for each violatio n and a willful 
vio~ation that results i~ the death of an employ 7e can bring a fine up to $10,000 or impr i sonment for up to six months. 11 
These penalties apply to every individual violation cited 
during the inspection. During 1972 there were a total of 
36,100 compliance inspections held resulting in 125,400 viola-
tions disclosed, 23,900 citat i ons issued and a total of 
$3,121,000 in penalties proposed.1 2 
The employer has 15 days in which to notify OSHA that 
he intends to protest the citation or proposed penalty. 
Unless a protest is made dur i ng that time, the citation and 
penalty becomes final. To facilitate a review and appeal 
procedure, Congress has provided an agency which has no 
connection with the U.S. Department of Labor with the task of 
fully reviewing each contested case. This agency is the 







Review Commission assigns the case to an administrative law 
judge who investigates the case and makes a finding. The 
employer can accept or object to the findings and the next 
step for a contest is employer appeal to the U.S. Circuit 
court of Appeals for the circuit in which the case arose • . 
OSHA inspectors may not shut down any operation; however, 
if he finds violations that pose serious physical harm or 
death to employees, he may act to have the operation shut down 
by order of a U.S. District Court. Before taking this action 
the inspector must warn the employer of the danger and of 
the action that OSHA intends to take. 14 
At the time of the passage of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act, most states had their own occupational safety and 
health programs but the programs varied widely from state to 
state. In the Act, Congress tasked the Secretary of Labor to 
encourage the States to assume the fullest responsibility for 
safety and health programs that are as effective as the 
Federal program. Furthermore, those States that fail to deve-
lop acceptable state programs and have them approved by the 
Department of Labor will lose their authority to enforce job 
safety and health standards. Congress provided funds through 
OSHA for the financing, planning and operation of the state 
programs.15 After a plan is approved, OSHA retains authority 
to enforce the Federal standards until it determines on the 
basis of at least three years of operation, that the state 
program is meeting all OSHA requirements. Subsequent to this 
milestone, the state takes over full authority and responsibili-
ty for administering the state program and OSHA assumes a 
monitoring function. OSHA will continue to inspect for any 
standards not covered by a state program and will periodically 
evaluate the state program and operation for eligibility to 
continue in the place of OSHA. In those states failing to 
submit a plan or failing to have a plan approved, OSHA will 
continue its inspection and other activities in that state. 
Currently, almost every state has submitted plans to OSHA but 
to date only three plans, Oregon, South Carolina and Montana, 
have been approved.16 
Complying with OSHA regulations can involve a substantial 
initial financial outlay by a business for such items as new 
equipment, safety gear and process modification. In order to 
ease some of the economic burden faced by small businesses, 
Congress amended the Small Business Act to make it possible 
for small employers to obtain long-term loans through the 
Small Business Administration to assist them ;n bringing 
their workplaces up to compliance standards. 1 
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It can be seen that OSHA has and will continue to have a 
significant impact on the non-Federal employers and employees. 
The Act has given strong emphasis to the right of an employee 0 
to a safe and healthful work environment and has ·backed this 
emphasis with potential employer penalties for non-compliance. 
Faced with the probability of fines, employers have no choice 
but to invest whatever capital is necessary to bring their 
workplaces up to standard. This expenditure will, of course, 
be reflected in the output price of the business and this will O 
be the primary impact of OSHA through the non-Federal business 
to the military. The next section of this paper will describe 
the current impact of OSHA on the Federal employer/employee. 
OSHA and the Federal Employer/Employee 
The Occupational Safety and Health Act makes each Federal 
agency head responsible for establishing and maintaining an 
effective and comprehensive occupational safety and health 
program which is consistent with the OSHA standards, to keep 
adequate records of all occupational accidents and illnesses 
and to make these records available to the Secretary of Labor. 
Also, the head of each agency is required to make an annual 
report to the Secretary of Labor with respect to occupational 
accidents and illness statistics and to consult with the 
Secretary with regard to the form and content of agency 
records. 18 
Executive Order 11612 of July 26, 1971, directs all 
Federal departments and agencies to implement and maintain 
occupational safety and health programs that at least meet 
the requirements that OSHA has set for non-Federal employers/ 
employees. Each department and agency is required to submit 
its proposed safety program to the Secretary of Labor for 
annual evaluation. The Executive Order directs the Secretary 
of Labor to provide guidance to the heads of Federal agencies 
and departments and to assist them in fulfilling their 
occupational safety and health responsibilities and to evalu-
ate the safety programs of the departments and agencies 
annually. The Executive Order provides that " •.. with the f] 
consent of the head of the affected department or agency, 
the Secretary (of Labor) may conduct at headquarters or in 
the field such investigations as he deems necessary .•• " In 
this Order, the President created the Federal Safety Advisory 
Counc ·il to advise the Secretary of Labor in carrying out his 
responsibilities under the Executive Order. The fifteen mem-
bers of the council include representatives of Federal depart-




The current impact of OSHA upon the military and the civi-
lian employees of the military is not of the direct nature of 
the impact upon non-Federal employers/employees. It is in-
direct in that the independent safety programs of each mili-
tary department must at least meet the standards set by OSHA. 
Furthermore, the compliance functions, including inspections, 
reside with the departments and OSHA has no function within 
the departments. Only with the permission of the head of the 
Federal department can OSHA make an inspection of any Federal 
installation. This permission is probably seldom, if ever, 
given. OSHA has no punitive powers over the departments and 
can only advise as to the content of the departmental safety 
programs. The annual Federal department report to OSHA is 
currently used only for the OSHA data base. 
The impact of OSHA upon the military is thus seen to be 
minimal, especially by comparison with the impact of OSHA upon 
the non-Federal sector. There are, however, proposals from 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration which are 
currently being evaluated that have potential for significant-
ly affecting the Federal sector. Those proposals are the sub-
ject of the next section of this report. 
Proposed Changes to OSHA Affecting the Federal Employer/Employee 
Currently, two proposed changes to Federal occupational 
safety and health regulations are being reviewed that will 
significantly impact on Federal employers and employees, in-
cludin,g the Department of Defense. The first, currently being 
considered by the Federal Safety Advisory Council, is a pro-
posed modification to Executive Order 11612. A discussion of 
the key points of that proposal follows. Departments and 
agencies would be requested to submit in their budgetary re-
quests a line item that would fund safety and health training 
and correction of physical conditions which violate standards. 
Departments and agencies would be required to designate an 
official at the Assistant Secretary level to direct their 
safety and health programs. The departments and agencies 
would be required to insure that all employees receive recog-
nition for excellent performance in safety and health and, 
conversely, employees at all levels who fail to carry out 
standards would be disciplined appropriately. Finally, in the 
proposed order, the departments and agencies would be re-
quested to "actively" seek guidance from OSHA in the safety 
and health field and would be required, upon request of the 
Secretary of Labor, to consent to an investigation or inspec-
tion by OSHA personne1. 20 
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The other significant proposed change is in the form of 
an amendment to the OSHA regulations to include a complete 
section on Federal employees. The proposal defines standard- 0 
ized record keeping and reporting procedures for Federal de-
partments and agencies and defines guidelines for the depart-
ments and agencies to follow for the establishment and opera-
t i on of an occupational safety and health program which is 
quite similar to the civilian OSHA program. The responsibili-
ty for enforcing each department and agency's program would 
remain with the individual department and agency heads but 0 
each program would be required to conform with the majority 
of OSHA regulations. 
The reporting and record keeping sections of the proposal 
outlines procedures for both the individual agencies and for 
the establishments within each agency. Each establishment 
would be required to keep a log of all recordable occupation-
al injuries and illnesses. In addition, each agency would be 
required to keep a suppleme n tary log of all injuries and ill-
nesses. Each agency would be required to compile both a 
quarterly and annual swnmary of occupational injuries and ill-
nesses by establishment and submit them to OSHA. Each Federal 
agency would also be required to compile by establishment a 
quarterly and annual summary of Federal occupational accidents 
and submit the reports to OSHA. All forms used in the logs 
and reports would be the standard OSHA forms used in the civi-
lian sector as adapted to a Federal format. The head of the 
Federal agency would be required to report to OSHA within two 
working days the occurrence of an accident which is fatal to 
one or more employees, which results in the hospitalization of 
five or more employees, or which involves property damage of 
$100,000 or more • . The records of the agencies and establish-
ments would be required to be made available and accessible to 
the Secretary of Labor or his authorized representative. 
The proposal makes the head of each Federal agency re-
sponsible for furnishing to each of his employees a safe and 
healthful workplace. It makes each Federal employee (includ-
ing military) responsible for complying with the respective 
0
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agency's occupational safety and health program and it pro-
vides for appropriate recognition for carrying out the pro-
grams and for disciplinary measures for failure to carry out 
program responsibilities. Each agency would be required to 
adopt the OSHA standards as they apply to that agency and to 
establish an internal inspection program employing agency 
inspectors to inspect every workplace at least annually. The 
inspectors, like OSHA inspectors, would conduct unannounced 




usual OSHA inbriefing and outbriefing with the official in 
charge of the establishment. The agency inspector would be 
accompanied on the inspection by a representative of the 
official in charge of the establishment and by a representa-
tive of the employees of the establishment. The inspector 
would be required to consult with employees of the establish-
ment concerning occupational safety and health matters and 
during the course of the inspection, any employee would be 
afforded the opportunity to bring any hazard he believes to 
exist to the attention of the agency inspector. 
The proposal would not only give the Federal employee 
the right to point out alleged hazards to the agency inspec-
tors during an inspection, it also would give Federal employ-
ees the right to request in writing an inspection of the work-
place by the agency safety and health officials. The name of 
the person making the request would not be disclosed to any-
one other than the designated safety and health official. 
Employees would be entitled to review the final disposition 
of the complaint by the agency and, if dissatisfied with that 
disposition, would be allowed to contact, in writing, the 
Office of Federal Agency Safety Programs to request a review 
of the disposition. The head of the Federal agency would be 
required to take any needed safeguards necessary to insure 
that no Federal employee in his agency would be discriminated 
against for exercising his rights under the proposal. 
Whenever an agency safety and health official concluded, 
on the basis of an inspection, that conditions or practices 
exist in any place of employment which could reasonably be ex-
pected to cause death or serious physical harm to any employ-
ees, he would be empowered to shut down the hazardous opera-
tion. He would be required to inform the affected employees 
and the official in charge of the establishment of the hazard 
prior to requiring that the operation be shut down. 
Subsequent to an inspection, the agency safety and health 
officials would be required to formally issue notices of 
hazards and violations discovered during the inspection to 
the official in charge of the establishment. These notices 
would fix a reasonable amount of time for the abatement of 
the hazard with which the official in charge would be required 
to comply. After the hazards are corrected by the establish-
ment, a reinspection by the agency would be requirea.21 
As can be seen from the above discussion, there is a 
striking similarity between the proposed rules for Federal 
occupational safety and health programs and the current 
rules for the civilian OSHA program as presented in an earlier 
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section of this paper. Federal employees, including military 
personnel, will have rights similar to those of civilian per-
sonnel. Federal employers will have responsibilities similar 
to those of civilian employers. The major difference is that 
in the civilian sector OSHA is vested with the inspection and 
punitive powers whereas in the proposals those powers reside 
with the head of the Federal department or agency . Two other 
significant differences are evident. The first is the fre-
quency of inspection for compliance. In the civilian sector, 
the inspections are based on a system of priorities. These 
include, in order: 1) catastrophies and other fatal accidents; 
2) valid employee complaints; 3) special emphasis programs 
including target industries (longshoring, construction, meat 
and meat products) and target health hazards (asbestos, carbon 
monoxide, lead) and then 4) random selec t ion from all types 
and sizes of workplaces in all sections of the country. With 
the exception of targeted industries, the chances of any 
give n workplace being inspected within a given year are slight 
(36,100 inspections in 1972 out of approximately five million 
eligible workplaces).22 The proposed Federal program stipu-
lates that every Federal workplace will be inspected at least 
annually. The other significant difference is in shutting 
down of hazardous operations. The OSHA inspector cannot 
directly shut down a hazardous civilian operation . The Feder-
al agency inspector can directly shut down an operation under 
his jurisdiction. In these two differences, the proposed 
Federal regulations can be seen to be somewhat more stringent 
than O~HA's civilian program . 
Applying the proposed Federal regulations to the military, 
the major impact will be that of giving much more "teeth" to 
existing safety programs. The proposed recordkeeping proced-
ures are not much different from what now exists. Unannounced 
safety inspections by "outsiders" of purely military units 
will require some readjustment, as will some of the new rights 
of servicemen. Budgetary considerations may cause a signifi-
cant impact upon the military. Also, specific exceptions 
to OSHA standards will probably be required for total weapons 
systems such as warships, airplanes, and tanks. As existing 
military safety standards are currently required to meet or 
exceed OSHA standards, the transition from independent t o an 
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Navy Recruitment And Reenlistment 
In A Draft-free Environment 
By AlexandeJL Shai.alr. 
Th.i..6 papeti. de.a.U wUh valLi..ou..6 a.6pech 06 1LecJtuU-
me.nt, 6ht1.d.-.t.eti.m expeJt.lenc.e.6, and 1Leen.tl6tmen.t. 
06 e.nU.6:t.ed Navy pelLllonnei.. The objedive .l6 
to gain .6 ome ..i.n.s-i.ght -i..n.t.o the 60Jr..C.e.6 at WOlt.k 
wh.lc.h deteJr.mlne .the qua.U..ty and 11W11be1U1 06 en-
futed pelr.6onne.t -i.n the Navy. The.6e qu.u.tlortli 
a/Le o 6 c:u.Jl/ten.t. -i.mpOJr .. :ta.nc.e., c.o rtli.i.deJt.lng the -i.n-
CILe.a.6-i.ng c.omplexi:ty 06 modell.n wea.pon-6 .&y.&.tem6 
and ..the gene/Ull need 601L manpowell 1Leple.tt-i..6hmen.t 
-i.n the. Navy -i.n Ught 06 the 1Le.c.en.t cli.6c.o~c.e 
06 the dlr..a.6.t.. 
Th-u papeJL wa.6 i.ubmitted :to P1Laoe.6.601L Mlc.ha.e.t 
Ve.an 601t. Hw,:ia.n RuoUllc.U Vevelopmen.t I HG-3002). 
The Navy's Need for People 
The Department of Defense is the biggest single employer 
in the country, employing over three million military and 
civilian people. After the Army, the Navy is the largest 
agency . in DOD. There are about 560,000 enlisted personnel 
in the Navy. Currently, there is a turnover rate of about 
one in seven per year, resulting in a requirement for new 
recruits estimated at about 100,000 for FY 1975, and 114,000 




How It Is Done. Although the authority to draft men into 
the armed forces officially expired on 30 June 1973, in actuali-
ty no one has been drafted since 1 January 1973 . 2 With the 
elimination of the draft threat, the principal factors influ- [J 
encing enlistments into the Navy are advertising and the efforts 
of the Navy Recruiters. 
Ue.utenan.t Commandeti. Ai.e.~e/l Sha.talt, CEC, USN, ILec.e.-i.ve.d h.l6 B.S. degll.ee 
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Advertising. A sampling of 765 newly inducted men inter-
viewed in September 1972 revealed a fairly high awareness of 
advertising for all the services. In general, the Army was 
highest, followed by the Navy, Air Force and Marines. Posters 
and billboards were the most remembered media followed by 
television, magazines, brochures, mail, radio and newspapers. 
The Navy's slogan "Join the Navy and See the World" was identi-
fied by 72% of the enlistees while a new slogan used in the 
summer campaign ("Get A Little More In The Navy") was only 
identified by 13%. Television was found to be the most cost-
effective medium, followed by posters and billboard~, with 
magazine advertisements being least cost-effective. 
Interview With Local Area Recruiter. An interview on 6 
May 1974 with one of the two Monterey area Navy recruiters 
gave some insights into local recruiting operations which pre-
sumably are comparable to those of other recruiting offices 
around the country. The following are some of the pertinent 
details of the interview: 
- Recruiters rely heavily on advertising to bring the 
prospective enlistees to the Recruiting Office. 
Recruiters solicit free air time from local TV and 
radio stations. Most stations are cooperative, even 
though the time given is seldom prime time . 
- The recruiters supply the stations with prepared 
tapes and films obtained from the Naval Recruiting 
' Command in Washington, D.C. 
- To some extent, recruiters also try to use personal 
contacts outside the recruiting office as a means 
of recruiting. Apparently, there is no prescribed 
method of operation in this area as it was described 
as "subtly approaching potential enlistees anywhere 
they happen to be - the local bowling alley, pool 
hall, gas station, etc." Active recruiting is not 
permitted in the local high schools, a prohibition 
which apparently is common throughout the country. 
In Monterey, recruiters are permitted to set up an 
information booth at the twice-a-year Career Day 
held at the high schools . Although information 
about the Navy may be given out at these times, no 
active recruiting is permitted on the high school 
grounds. 
- Anyone expressing an interest in the Navy is in-
vited to come to the Recruiting Office. Once there, 
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the person is interviewed regarding his aspirations 
and qualifications, and any questions concerning 
the Navy are answered. 
- In order to determine the individual's eligibility 
for the various Navy schools, he is asked to take 
the Short Basic Test Battery (SBTB) which provides 
an indication of such things as Arithmetic, Mechani-
cal and General Aptitudes. The SBTB is based on a 
scale of 100 points and personnel are categorized 
as being in Group I, II, III or IV on the basis of 
their test scores. Those scoring below 35 on the 
test are categorized as Group IV, or the lower 
mental group. Local recruiters are not allowed to 
enlist these individuals. However, if the man has 
a strong desire to join the Navy, the recruiter 
forwards the man1 s applicatio n to the Armed Forces 
Examining Station, Oakland, which is the regional 
headquarters for the Monterey Recrui t ing Office. 
The filling of Group IV quotas is accomplished at 
the regional headquarters level. 
- Provided the individual fulfills physical, age and 
moral character requirements, he is eligible for en-
listment in the Navy. 
- Lengths of regular enlistments vary from 2 to 6 years, 
with the shorter terms involving active participation 
in the Naval Reserve after the active duty period. 
In addition, there are some other reserve oriented 
enlistments which involve a short period on active 
duty (usually ,for the purpose of attending a Navy 
school), followed by an extended conunitment to the 
Reserves. 
- Based on the SBTB score, the individual's desires, 
and quota availability, the recruiter may suggest one 
or more options to the prospective enlistee. Rough-
ly 85% of enlistees have been found to be A-School 
eligible. A-Schools are the primary schools for the 
training of new enlistees in the skills required by 
the Navy. The length of training courses ranges 
from a minimum of six weeks for signalmen to a maxi-
mum of 24 months for Advanced Electronics Technicians 
and Nuclear Technicians. 
- For those not qualified or not desiring an A-School 







which allows one to go directly to sea duty after 
completion of boot camp. These people are usually 
assigned to deck force, aviation or engineering 
(boiler room) duty for on-the-job training. The 
Monterey recruiter's observation was that generally 
the individuals electing this option have been in 
the lower Group III category. 
Assuming the prospective enlistee is interested · in 
one of the school options, the recruiter is author-
ized to "guarantee" the school that the individual 
desires. There - is another series of exams given 
shortly after enlistment. These exams are slightly 
more difficult than the SBTB but, generally, pose 
no problem for individuals who did well on the SBTB. 
Unless the individual performs extremely poorly on 
these exams, every effort is made to give him the 
schooling he was guaranteed when he came in. Accord-
ing to the Monterey recruiter, he has no personal 
knowledge of non-compliance with a recruiter's 
"guarantee." 
The "typical" recruit, in the experience of the re-
cruiter interviewed, was between 17 and 23 years of 
age, single, and a high school graduate. Occasional-
ly, a married individual with dependents and previ-
ous . service will reenlist, but the majority of first-
term enlistees are single men. 
It is interesting to note some of the incentives and 
guidelines that the recruiters themselves work under: 
- Recruiters generally range in rating from Petty 
Officer Second Class (E-5) to Chief Petty Officer 
(E-7). Quite often they have just come from sea 
duty, so recruiting duty is looked upon as a wel-
come change. 
- Recruiters receive three weeks of recruiting 
training prior to reporting to their new assign-
ment. 
- They receive $50 per month special pay while on 
recruiting duty. 
- They are ordinarily assigned a Navy vehicle for use 
in their work. 
0 
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- Recruiting duty is nominally an 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. 
five-day-a-week job. 
For the Monterey office, the following conditions were 
found to exist: 
Recruiters worked in a well-lighted, smartly furnished, 
new office. 
- There are no officers assigned to the Recruiting 
Office; the men are essentially "their own bosses." 
- The minimal mont hly recruitment quota varies from 
six to eight enlistees, depending on the time of 
year. 
- The regional office rewards exceptional performance 
by awarding specially designed name tags and letters 
of commendatio n . 
Who Joins. Background and demographic data on 6,795 re-
cruits who entered the Navy i n February 1970 are offered with 
the intent of providing a profile of the types of individuals 
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From urban or rural areas? 
From towns less than 25,000 
population 
From towns 25,000-100,000 
population 
From cities 100,000 or 
larger population 
From suburban areas 
From farm or ranch 
From rural areas other than 




















Number of brothers and sisters (as a gauge of experienc-
ing living with others): 
An only child 
One sister or brother 
Two or three sisters or 
brothers 
Four or more sisters or 
brothers 
Parental stability: 





son was growing up 84% 
Parents divorced 8% 
Parents separated 4% 
Family relocation experienced: 
Not moved in 10 years or more 51% 
Moved once or twice in 10 years 29% 
Moved three or more times 19% 
Education of enlistees: 
High school graduate or 
. passed GED 
Had some college 
Did not graduate from high 
school 




College preparatory course 43% 
Vocational or trade training 20% 
General education 22% 
Work Experience prior to Navy: 
None 
One or two jobs 




The following may be concluded from the statistics: 
1. Enlistees are young (median age - 19.2 years) . 
2. A large nwnber are dependent on someone - parent or 
guardian - just prior to enlistment in the Navy. 
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3. There is a large number of whites, small number of 
other races, as compared with national racial distribution. 
4. More than half of enlistees come from areas of less 
than 25,000 population. 
5. More than half have two or more brothers or sisters. 
6. Significant stability of family (few divorces) and 
home (few moves) are apparent. 
7. Over 70% are high school graduates. 
8. Over 75% had formal work experience before coming 
into the Navy. 
Why Men Join. The 6,795 recruits were polled to deter-
mine to what extent certain factors played a part in their 
decision to join the Navy. Each of the reasons was rated on 
a four level scale. The reasons receiving the highest rating 
were as follows: 
Reasons 
1. Wanting to get technical training 
2. Wanting to travel 
3. Wanting to get educational benefits 
after leaving the service 
4. Need for time to find out what you 
want to do with your life 
5. Wanting to serve your country 
6. Not wanting to wait until you were 
drafted 
7. Wanting a Navy career 
8. Wanting to be more on your own 
9 . Believe you could get a better job 
in the Navy than in civilian life 
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10. Wanting to live a military life 
11. Needing a job 
8% 
7% 
Four times as many recruits entered the Navy with definite 
plans to serve only one enlistment as entered with definite 
plans to reenlist (32% vs. 8%). The bulk of the recruits (60%) 
had not made up their minds. Feeling with respect to follow-
ing a Naval career were similar to those regarding reenlist-
ment. In the sununary of the survey, the author, Aaron Katz, 
states the following: "The four categories of possible 
motivating conditions studied (job-related, interpersonal re-
lations, physical and mental well-being, and education and 
training) were all highly valued by at least half the recruits 
at entry into the Navy. The Navy was viewed more often than 
civilian life as the environment which would provide the op-
portunity for satisfying needs in the areas of interpersonal 
relations, and education and training. The Navy and civilian 
life were each viewed as more likely of providing the differ-
ent aspects of the areas of job-related conditions, and physi-
cal and mental well-being. 116 
In his concluding remarks, Mr. Katz states, in part: 
"Of particular note, many recruits appear to be interested 
in upward social mobility. Recruits see the Navy more fre-
quently as an environment where they can satisfy some short 
term goal, particularly getting technical training. As would 
be expected because of this point of view, a small proportion 
of these men reenlist. The bulk of recruits are undecided 
about reenlisting, which would leave them subject to influence 
either positively or negatively towards the Navy. It should 
be pointed out that they will get better treatment in the 
Navy than in civilian life or equal treatment. This situation 
should represent a challenge to Naval personnel who supervise 
these first termers since their supervisors are their closest 
points of contact with the Navy and their treatment by super-
visors at this time probably typifies for them what they can 
expect to encounter in the future. 117 
Experiences of the First-Term Enlistee in the Navy 
Boot Camp. The first thing experienced by a Navy enlist-
ee is Recruit Training (Boot Camp). The training is generally 
thought of as intended to condition the new man mentally and 
physically for military life through three months of vigorous 
participation in such activities as physical training, march-
ing, class work and following orders. 
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Some 1200 enlistees were polled before and after Boot 
Camp to determine what effect Boot Camp training might have 
on an enlistee's attitudes and perceptions.B One of the find- O 
ings was that attainment perceptions in favor of the Navy de-
creased in all categories. That is, the opportunity for 
satisfying needs in the areas of interpersonal relations, 
physical and mental well-being, and education and training, 
though still favoring the Navy, did so by a smaller margin 
after Boot camp than before. In several subcategories, the 
numbers favoring the civilian environment exceeded those 0 
favoring the Navy, a reversal of the results obtained before 
Boot Camp. These subcategories were: 
Do kind of work I like best 
Get fairer treatment 
Get to talk things over with those 
about you 
Have a good life in general 
However, despite these results the number of individuals 
intending to reenlist increased from 10% to 13.7% and the 
number intending to get out after completing their enlistment 
decreased from 35% to 27.5%. The number undecided increased 
from 55% to 58.8%.9 The authors offer several explanations 
for these · apparently contradictory results. The explanation 
which . seems most plausible to this writer follows: 
" •.• the attainment perceptions which were assessed 
at entry to recruit training may be a partial re-
flection of preference rather than being 'objec-
tive' perceptions of attainment opportunity in the 
Navy environment versus civilian life ••• On the 
other hand attainment perceptions assessed at the 
end of recruit training are more likely, than 
entry perceptions, to reflect information about 
how individuals perceive and evaluate the environ-
ment on the basis of their experience in that en-
vironment.1110 
After Boot Camp. In their study, Robert F. Lockman, et. 
al., conclude that after two years in the Navy, about a third 
of enlistees will have married and perhaps have a dependent 
child. Some will have been to Class A School, all will have 
had on-the-job training and some will have had sea duty. Ac-





reenlist after these experiences are influenced by the follow-
ing variables: 
l. Economic opportunities and rewards - secure jobs; 
special pays such as proficiency pay, reenlistment bonus, 
hazardous duty or incentive pay; and retirement and fringe 
benefits; 
2. Attitudes of their wives, girl friends, families, 
or friends that are not unfavorable to reenlistment, family 
separation, Navy income and housing; 
3. Liking their duty station, which is in turn related 
to satisfaction with mess and recreational facilities, living 
conditions and underway time; 
4. Liking their ratings or work, that is, using their 
Navy training in their duty assignments, spending less time 
than average standing watches at sea, and being rated higher 
in performance by their supervisors; 
5. Having been volunteers rather than draft motivated 
when they joined the Navy for a longer enlistment term; 
6. The fact that they have less education and have ac-
quired dependents for whom they receive extra pay, so that 
their Navy employment prospects may look at least as good as 
those in civilian life; 
7. Having come from a parental family broken by death, 
divorce or separation, perhaps having found a stable life in 
the Navy that they lacked at home.11 
Another observation made by the authors is that" ••• 
the strong regulations against discriminatory practices---
whether they be regional, racial - ethnic, or social class -
attract socially disadvantaged men, particularly from the 
laboring (lower) classes, who develop a strong career commit-
ment.1112 
Based on a poll taken in 1972, Peter H. Stoloff, et al, 
present observations similar to the above in concise, tabular 
form.13 The tables are based on a sample space of 3,115 
first-term enlistees assigned to sea duty aboard two carriers 
and 18 destroyers. See tables follow: 
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Table 1 
SUMMARY OF REENLISTMENT INTENT RATES 
0 
Proportion of Proportion Intending 
Grou2 Total Sam2le to Reenlist 
Total Sample 1.00 .05 0 
Draft pressure: 
True volunteers .26 .09 
Draft-motivated • 74 .03 
Marital Status: .33 .07 
Married • 33 .07 
Non-married .67 .04 
Duty Station: 
Destroyer .29 .06 
CVA .71 .04 
Pay grade: 
E-4 .65 .04 
E-5 • 35 .06 
Race: 
Caucasian .95 .04 
Non.:.caucasian .05 .21 
Table 2 
SUMMARY OF REASONS GIVEN FOR REENLISTMENT INTENTIONS* 
Reason Reenlist Intention Not Reenlist 
Undecided 
Living condi- 8 
tions .04 .08 .09 
Retirement . 29 . 04 .03 
Military life .OS • 13 .40 . 
Duty • 32 .39 .15 
Leadership .04 .12 .26 
Working conditions .02 .11 .07 
Civilian alterna-
tive .04 .oo . 15 
















*Entries are proportions of those stating a given intention 
who gave each reason. 
0 Several studies have shown that the actual reenlistment 
rate is usually about twice as great as the intended rate in-
dicated in polls such as the above. That is, where the above 
poll indicated that 5% of the men intended to reenlist the 
actual figure would be somewhere around 10%. 
Problems/Possible Solutions 
The two principal problems confronting Navy manpower 
planners are recruitment and first-term reenlistments. It 
has been found that the second term reenlistment rate is 
about 60% and the third term about 80%,14 so these are not 
problem areas. 
Recruitment. Recently, the Navy has been obtaining 
slightly less than its required quota of recruits. According 
to the April 1, 1974, issue of ALL HANDS, recruiters reached 
95.1%. 15 This represented a shortfall of 2558 recruits. 
Possibly this number will be made up in the second half of 
the fiscal year. The total requirement for the year is only 
75,000 men. However, there is concern in some quarters that 
the higher requirement of subsequent years, i.e., 114,000 in 
FY 1976, might be impossible to fill under present no-draft 
conditions. 16 
The following are offered as possible solutions to the 
recruitment problem: 
1. Recruiters should seek men who feel, or can be con-
vinced that job security, training and travel opportunities 
are important considerations in a Navy career and that job 
opportunities are better in the Navy than in civilian life.17 
2. The program for screening and training of men for 
recruiting duty should be evaluated. Three weeks of training 
appears to be a very short time for a job that is so impor-
tant. 
3. A concerted effort should be made to get high 
schools, trade schools and junior colleges to cooperate in 
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making Navy opportunities known to their students. The Navy 
should consider tuition/ t raining assistance programs with 0 
these schools similar to the NROTC college tuition-aid pro-
grams it has for officers. 
4. Navy shore units should be encouraged to become more 
involved in community affairs, particularly in programs with 
young people. For instance, the Navy Recruiter, together with 
the local reserve unit, could sponsor a Little League baseball 0 
team or a Sea Scout Troop. 
First-Term Reenlistments. In many ways the problems in-
volved with the first-reenlistment are greater and more com-
plex than those of enlistment. The individuals involved have 
"i nvested" from 4-6 years in the service, they are older, over 
1/3 are married and have children, and many approach it from 
the standpoint of "Stay in for 20 or get out." In other 
words, it is at this point that a man decides whether or not 
he will make a career of the Navy. 
Vice Admiral David H. Bagley, Chief of Naval Personnel, 
said to the Senate Armed Services Committee during military 
manpower hearings earlier this year that, overall, the Navy 
needs a first-term reenlistment rate "of somewhere between 25 
and 30 per cent." First-term reenlistments have, in fact, 
improved dramatically: from 17 per cent in FY 68 to a low 
10 per cent in FY 70, but up again in gradual increments to 
25 per cent in FY 74. However, the improvement has been 
spotty and there are serious shortages in 44 of the Navy's 
85 ratings. Some ratings, or skill specialties, are present-
ly overmanned, while others, particularly highly skilled rat-
ings, such as in the nuclear weapons and electronics fields, 
are well below requirements . 18 
The Navy's solution to the shortage of critical ratings 
has been the variable reenlistment bonus. The program has 
had some success and consideration is being given to modify-
ing it with expectations that the shortage of critical ratings 0 
will thus be brought under contro1.19 c, 
In the opinion of the present writer the improved overall 
reenlistment rates may be attributed to a number of things 
that have occurred in recent years: 
l. Substantial pay increases which make military pay 




2. Increased interest in personnel welfare as evidenced 
by z-Grams. 
3. Transition to new styles of enlisted uniforms (dress-
type with jacket and officers-type hat for liberty; new-
design uniform with baseball cap for work situations). 
4. More overseas homeporting of ships. (This reduces 
travel time and enables men to spend more time with their 
families.) 
5. The broadening of grooming and appearance guide-
lines to enable Navy men to adopt currently popular styles. 
6. Other personnel-oriented actions, many of which 
were instigated by Z-Grams. 
7. The present economic problems of the nation tend 
to discourage people in the services from getting out, hence 
reenlistments are up. 
It remains to be seen whether or not the 25-30% reenlist-
ment rate may be maintained over an extended period of time. 
In addition to the present programs intended to make the 
military more attractive as a career for enlisted personnel, 
the following are suggested: 
1. Develop programs of diversifying and expanding the 
"interest 11 content of jobs, as has been done in civilian 
industries faced with the problem of workers not liking their 
jobs. 20 
2. Since significant dissatisfaction with leadership 
and supervision was expressed by Navy men in various polls, 
more emphasis should be given to human relations training to 
Petty Officers and Chief Petty Officers who are supervisors. 
The Navy has a human relations training program, but it is 
primarily concerned with race relations, not job satisfaction 
and supervisory style.21 
3. Continue making every effort to minimize family 
separations and to enhance family well-being and happiness 
as family considerations tend to be the biggest single factor 
of dis •satisfaction with Navy life. 
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Management By Ohiectives In A 
Navy Personnel Of lice 
By Ca.Jtl J. Ramo 
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objecUveui p1t.og11.am .i.na. Navy Pe/t.6onnel 066.i.c.e and 
o o oe!L6 home. pJtoc.edWtai. guidanc.e in u:ta.b-U6h.lng 
.6 u.c.h a. ma.nag emen.t .& y.&t.em. 
Th.l-6 pa.pelt Wa..6 .6 ubmU:ted :to PM 6 eli-6 011. Wil..U.am 
Howalld ChuJr.c.h ooll Pe!L6onnel and La.boll Rela;ti.on-6 
(MN3101). 
The purpose of this term paper is to explore the feasibili-
ty of establishing a management by objectives (MBO) program in 
a Navy personnel office. 
A directive issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel states, 
11 In order to foster a concept of 'management by objectives,' 
reporting seniors should seek to establish with each and every 
subordinate mutually understood, finite objectives for which 
the s4bordinate will be held accountable. Subsequent fitness 
reports should then contain comment upon the degree of attain-
ment of each such objective. 111 




MBO i s a system of management which would insure that the 
efforts of the personnel officer were directed toward mutually 
agreed objectives established by him and approved by the execu-
tive office. These objectives would be in harmony with the [J 
command's mission and contribute toward the achievement of 
command objectives. 
It would also establish objectives for each person within 
the personnel office and insure that they were in accord with 
the objectives of the personnel office. These objectives 
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would bring into clear focus what is most important to accom-
plish. Additionally, MBO would provide for standards so that 
each person in the personnel office would know exactly what 
standards were expected of him. This standard should be at-
tainable by the average person and be one which could be ex-
ceeded by superior performance. 
The personal goals of each individual in the personnel 
office would be integrated with the goals of the personnel 
office, the command, and the Navy to create an atmosphere 
which encouraged greater individual achievement. A study con-
ducted for the Navy by the Institute for Social Research at 
the University of Michigan compared the levels of goal integra-
tion in the Navy with civilians. They discovered that civi-
lians were found to experience much higher levels of goal 
integration than Navy personnel, especially those who were 
young and better educated. The report concluded that the Navy 
must work on developing goal integration within its system if 
it is to be effective in recruitin~ and retaining personnel 
and if it is to function properly. 
The program of management by objectives is mainly con-
cerned with results. However, it does allow for personal 
freedom in achieving the results by permitting the individual 
to decide what objectives he desires to accomplish. Experi-
ence has shown that individuals are goal-orientated and MBO 
can accommodate personal goals while achieving goals of the 
personnel office and the command. MBO further enables the 
individual to establish the standards and priorities for 
accomplishing his objectives so long as they are mutually 
acceptable to his immediate supervisor. 
Management by objectives promotes delegation of authority 
and provides for a system of feedback and control. Tasks per-
formed by the personnel officer, office supervisor or section 
leaders that are not important to their established objectives 
should be delegated. Control of delegated authority can still 
be exercised by management by exception or by monthly or 
quarterly feedback and evaluation reports as the situation 
requires. 
Among the more important features of a MBO program is 
that it would enable the personnel officer and other office 
supervisors who prepare enlisted performance evaluations to be 
more objective. 
What are some of the benefits of an MBO program in a 
personnel office? 
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An MBO program established by the personnel officer would 
satisfy the ·requirements of the directive issued by the Chief 
of Naval Personnel previously mentioned. 0 
Managing by objectives would make the personnel officer, 
office supervisor and section leaders discussion of enlisted 
performance evaluations with their subordinates more mean i ng-
ful. Certainly, the discussion of evaluations with subordinates 
should not be perfunctory. Yet, too often the supervisor will o 
simply ask the subordinate if the evaluation looks all right 
to him and if he has any questions; and if he has none, that's 
the end of the "discussion!" The narrative would contain con-
crete achievements and not just flowery words. Marks assigned 
in the bottom 50% on the evaluation form could be more readily 
justified and the subordinate and senior would know why and 
they would be less defensive. 
Management by ob j ectives enables performance evaluations 
to be based on results achieved with a system for documenta-
tion. Consequently, assigned performance marks are more objec-
tive and less subjective which tends to enhance the subordin-
ate's motivation. 
When standards are written which spell out what is con-
sidered well done and state when the task is to be finished 
(which are established by the individual himself), it can be 
expected that excuses such as "I didn't know," or 111 assumed," . 
or "I ~as busy doing something else," will be seldom heard. 
MBO promotes the participation of subordinates. "Partici-
pation tends to increase commitment; commitment tends to 
heighten motivation; motivation which is job-oriented tends 
to make managers work harder and be more productive; and hard-
er and more productive work by managers tend to enhance the 
company's prosperity; therefore, participation is good. 114 
When subord i nates participate in management decisions by 
establishing their own objectives, it is more likely that 
they will accept the objective as being fair. 
Management by objectives allows subordinates to use their 
own discretion in accomplishing assigned tasks and establish-
ing the priority for accomplishing t hose objectives. Seniors 
are less inclined to tell his subordinate to drop everything 
and take care of some other "hot" project which often annoys, 
upsets, or angers the subordinate. MBO establishes the pro-
cedure whereby the subordinate can suggest his own plan of 





Supervisory personnel are less likely to personally get 
involved with unimportant pet projects because the program of 
management by objectives promotes delegation of authority. 
Sometimes seniors who are proficient in a particular area 
spend an unwarranted amount of time doing menial tasks that 
should be delegated. Therefore, MBO would tend to cause a 
shift in emphasis of the workload of managerial personnel. 
This would also free the personnel officer, office supervisor, 
and section leaders from some onerous tasks not on their ob-
jectives list and lock them in on other more knotty problems 
that are usually in their "projects pending basket." It also 
would allow them more time for other routine tasks and the 
unexpected. 
Management by objectives insures against last minute 
flaps. Deadlines and expectations are known and a breakdown 
in conununications is minimized. Seniors are less likely to 
feel misled. Sometimes seniors neglect to give adequate 
explanations or to discuss circumstances for tasks they assign 
to subordinates. When the task results desired and standards 
of performance are in writing, subordinates also tend to re-
spond with greater effort and connnitment. 
MBO forces managers to look critically at their duties 
and responsibilities and to take positive action to meet 
short and ~ong range objectives. 
The concept of setting goals enables a person to see 
where he is going; and it is more likely that he will get 
there. Setting goals and objectives has been a managerial 
tool for a long time. 
MBO enables an 'individual to fully understand the para-
meters of his responsibilities and how he will be measured. 
MBO provides for greater concentration of vital Navy and 
connnand targets. A static approach to objectives and goals 
could be detrimental to the Navy's goals. It also minimizes 
brushfire management--and any management tool that purports 
to reduce management by pressure should be thoroughly investi-
gated. 
Management by objectives improves techniques for planning 
and controlling work. Work can be more challenging or less 
demanding depending on the individual's capability and apti-
tude. 
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MBO enhances communications downward and upward between 
seniors and subordinates. Generally, good communications and 
high performance go together. 
Management by objectives allows for increased individual-
ism which is significant. Individuals throughout the country 
today are demanding to be treated as individuals and not num-
bers. MBO allows individuals to participate in management de-
cisions, gives them the personal freedom to achieve results, 
and lets them decide what priority to assign in accomplishing 
tasks. Management by objectives enables individuals to inte-
grate personal goals, e.g., participation, recognition, 
challenge, responsibility, self-esteem, self-actualization, 
etc., with the personnel office's goals, the command's objec-
tives, and the Navy's mission. Goal integration is the con-
cept of how compatible or congruent the individual's goals are 
with the Navy's mission and the command's objectives. 
The below are suggested steps in establishing a manage-
ment by objectives program i n the personnel office. 
There are two major stages in the implementation of the 
MBO program: 
1. The setting of goals with subordinates at the beginning 
of the time period (generally immediately after their perform-
ance evaiuation for the previous period is completed). 
•2. The measuring of results against goals at the end of 
the period (due date for their evaluation). 
In addition, there should be a continuous evaluation of per-
formance during the period involved for control. 
Setting goals with subordinates 
1. Identify the common goals of the personnel office. 
0 
0 
These are actually sub-goals of the Navy Department's policy 
to develop minimum manpower requirements necessary to accom- f} 
plish assigned missions with maximum essential effectiveness 
and efficiency. OPNAVINST 3120.32 establishes the following 
duties, responsibilities and authority of the personnel offi-
cer which can be used for general guidance for establishing 
common goals and setting standards: 
"303.9 Personnel Officer 
a. Basic Function. The personnel officer is 




accordance with the personnel assignment bill and 
for the administration and custody of enlisted per-
sonnel records. 
b. Duties, responsibilities and authority. 
l. Supervise the administration and opera-
tion of the personnel office. 
2. Prepare and maintain the service records 
of enlisted personnel. 
3. Ensure that all directives and communica-
tions relating to transfers, receipts, advancement 
or reduction in rating, reenlistments, or any other 
changes in the status of enlisted personnel are exe-
cuted and recorded. 
4. Supervise the processing of enlisted 
performance evaluation sheets, leave papers, identi-
fication cards, and orders. 
5. Interpret and apply directives pertain-
ing to administration of enlisted personnel. 
6. Supervise the compilation and forwarding 
of information from service records for the use of 
the commanding officer at commanding officer•s non-
judicial punishment, and maintain the mast record. 
7. Review the eligibility of personnel to 
attend service · schools. 
8. Supervise the professional training and 
education of enlisted personnel assigned to the ad-
ministrative office. 
9. Initiate any correspondence needed to 
ensure that pertinent information concerning the 
unit's allowance and use of personnel is brought to 
the attention of the type command or the Chief of 
Naval Personnel, as appropriate. 
10. Perform such other duties as may be as-
signed." 
It would actually be better to establish common goals and 
set standards for the personnel office based on the duties, 
responsibilities, and authority for the personnel officer set 
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forth in the local command's Organization and Regulations Manu-
al which are congruent with the mission of the command. O 
2. Each supervisor should set objectives with his immedi-
ate subordinate. The recommended way to accomplish this is: 
a. Give each subordinate a completed copy of Exhibit 
A and ask him to complete Exhibit B for the objectives he has 
in mind and set a date to discuss them with him. 0 
b. Before the meeting, list some of the objectives 
you would like to see him include. 
c. At the meeting, review the man's own objectives 
in detail, then offer your own suggestions or changes. Objec-
tives should "stretch" the individual a little, be challenging 
and not be easily accomplished. The personnel officer should 
approve all objectives established for individuals within the 
personnel office. 
d. Make two copies of the final draft of his objec-
tives--one for the man and one for the supervisor. 
e. Working from the final agreement or 11contract" 
with the man, the supervisor should ask the subordinate what 
he can do to help him accomplish his targets. Note his sugges-
tions, keep them with your copy, and include them in your ob-
jectives. 
Measuring results against goals 
This procedure is accomplished by the supervisor in three 
steps: 
1. About three weeks before the individual's enlisted 
performance evaluation is due, ask him to prepare a brief 
statement of his accomplishments compared with his targets 
and the reasons for any variances. 
2. Approximately two weeks before his evaluation is due, 
go over his report in detail. Search for the causes of the 
variances, and ask yourself: 
a. Was it your fault? 
b. Was it some failure on his part? 




Then, get his agreement on just how good his performance was 
and where he fell down, or where the organization let him 
down! 
3. This will help you to be more objective in evaluating 
his performance for the period. 
Management by objectives is time-consuming and according 
0 to Georges. Odiorne: 
This use of time on the manager's part is an impor-
tant aspect of management by objectives, and de-
pends heavily on three points of emphasis: 
1. Management by objectives is a system of 
managing, not an addition to the manager's job. 
2. The manager who adopts management by 
objectives as a system of managing must plan to 
drop some of his more time-consuming hobbies. 
This is another way of saying that the manager 
must delegate, or relinquish personal control of 
certain activities that he has hitherto personally 
manipulated or overseen in too much detail. 
3. The system of management by objectives 
entails a behavior change on the part of both the 
superior and subordinate. The subordinate moves 
ih a more results-oriented fashion because he knows 
what his goals are. His superior provides the 
instruction, help, and behavior that will help him 
succeed. 6 -
Will the Navy ever implement MBO? 
It is possible that the Navy will implement MBO on a full 
scale someday, but it is not probable that it will be soon. 
Management by objectives is still in its infancy and its im-
plementation will require some attitude changes. It is a 
results-orientated management tool that is more readily adapt-
able to a profit-making organization rather than a military 
organization. The attitude changes will primarily be from 
managers who may feel that implementation of MBO will reduce 
their · authority and significantly increase paperwork. Others 
may feel that MBO is the "establishment's" tool to get more 
work out of all hands. Some will say it is too time consum-
ing. However, there are positive gains to be derived from a 
viable MBO program that can only be appreciated by a thorough 
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understanding of the benefits to be gained for both the Navy 
and the individual. It should be understood that MBO is not 
a ready made standard, a panacea management tool, or a cook-
book recipe for managerial success. It is not a crutch where-
in supervisors can sit back and wait for great things to 
happen. It takes a great deal of effort and involvement to 
make it a viable program. The Navy, in general, has always 
been involved in managing and applying generally accepted 
concepts and principles of management. The very nature of 
setting goals is appealing and has merit. 
In view of the fact that the Navy in 1971 included the 
provisions for assessing goal setting and the achievement of 
goals on the officer's fitness report indicates a positive 
move toward an MBO system. To date, this movement has been 
getting increasing attention and gaining momentum. Another 
area receiving considerable attention is goal integration. 
The management by objectives program is concerned with goal 
integration and provides a method of appraising personnel 
based on goal setting and achievement of goals. A statement 
made by Rensis Likert that seems to be echoing throughout our 
country is significant: "The trend in America, generally, in 
our schools, in our homes and in our communities, is toward 
giving the individual greater freedom and initiative. There 
are fewer direct, unexplained orders in schools and homes, 
and youngs t ers are participating increasingly in decisions 
which affect them. These fundamental changes in American 
society create expectations among employees as to how they 
should . be treated. 11 7 
0 
0 
In conclusion, it is felt that it would be possible and 
beneficial to implement a management by objectives program in 
a Navy personnel office providing it was on a Navy-wide basis 
and had command support. There is substantial merit in any 
program that sets objectives and standards of performance for 
the reasons discussed above. However, it is realized that it 
would not be practical to quantify or measure some objectives 
in a personnel office such as improving attitude or the quali-
ty of service. Moreover, guidance from the Bureau of Naval {] 
Personnel might be required to establish standards of perform-






COMMON GOALS AND STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE 




COMMON GOALS AND 
STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE 
1. Job Responsibility. A complete consecutively numbered 
listing of all job responsibilities of the personnel office 
set forth in the command's Organization and Regulations Manual 
and other tasks which may be assigned for accomplishment by 
the personnel officer should be listed. 
2. Common goals and standards of performance. Each job re-
sponsibility is to be reviewed and a minimum standard of per-
formance established. If possible, all standards are to be 
quantified for measurement. A standard is a condition that 
will exist when the job is considered well done. 
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EXHIBIT B 
MBO PROGRAM STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES FOR (Billet Title) ~~.;;;..==~:;......;;;..,;;;;.;;.;;;..;~---
0 
JOB RESPONSIBILITY OBJECTIVE: 
NUMBER PRESENT CONDITION DESIRED RESULT PRIORITY 
0 
Notes: 
1. Job responsibility number. This number corresponds with 
Exhibit A's job responsibility numbers. 0 
2. Present condition: Self-explanatory CJ 
3. ObJect1.ve: desired result; In addition to the desired re-
sult, each objective must include '' by (date) 11 that objective 
will be accomplished . 
4. Priority: The order or precedence is established by the 




1. BUPERS Instruction 1611.12D of 16 Nov 71, Subj: Report on 
the Fitness of Officers (NAVPERS 1611/1) (Rev. 9-72), p. 
12. 
2. Ronald A. Hale, Management by Objectives in Today's Navy, 
O Thesis, June 1974, p. 8. 
3. BUPERS Notice 1616 of 16 Aug 73, Subj: Master, Senior, 
Chief Petty Officer Evaluation Report. 
4. Ernest C. Miller, Objectives and Standards: An Approach 
to Planning and Control, American Management Association, 
Inc., 1966, p. 38. 
5. Harold s. Pittman, Navy Management by Objectives, Thesis, 
April 1972, p. 35. 
6. George S. Odiorne, Management by Objectives, New York: 
Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1965, pp. 577-79. 
7. Georges. Odiorne, How Managers Make Things Happen, Engle-
wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961, p. 61. 
75 
\ 
0 
• 
0 
0 
• 
0 
• 
• 
0 
• 
8 
